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Foreword
The Third Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology was or-
ganised in Helsinki 27–30 August 2003. The conference had three co-organis-
ers: the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the
United Nations (HEUNI), the Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology,
and the Department of Criminal Law, Procedural Law and General Jurispruden-
tial Studies of the University of Helsinki.
The first contribution to this volume is the Opening address of the conference
by Mr. Johannes Koskinen, the Finnish Minister of Justice, followed by eight in-
vited plenary presentations. As to the ninth (Neil Walker: Constitutionalizing
European Criminal Justice), invited at short notice, only the abstract was avail-
able.
The theme of the conference was “Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating
Europe”. Relating to this, the plenary presentations cover topical issues of Euro-
pean integration, crime, and criminal policy, including the enlargement process
of the European Union.
Some of these texts have been revised by the authors after the event. They have
thus had the opportunity to comment some of the eventual discussions, rendering
the outcome more dynamic a flavour.
HEUNI has considered the creation of a truly European forum for scientific
criminological exchanges as a very important step towards a better integration of
the European criminological communities. This volume intends to provide evi-
dence of the potential of this positive development.
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Minister of Justice, Finland
Ladies and Gentlemen,
On behalf of the Finnish Ministry of Justice I have the great pleasure to open this,
the third, annual Congress of the European Society of Criminology. The theme
of the Congress is “Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating Europe”. First I
would like to present some perspectives of the Finnish Ministry of Justice relat-
ing to this theme.
1. Basic Rights and the EU Constitution
One of the central issues in the debate on the future of the EU is the status of fun-
damental rights and in particular how the protection of these rights can be
strengthened. One of the means through which the Union aims at reinforcing the
citizens’confidence in the Union’s work is by developing the EU Charter on Ba-
sic Rights into a legally binding system of norms. In case the EU adopts the Con-
vention on Human Rights, and this is something particularly Finland has been
working for, the EU will be covered by the same external Human Rights control
as the member states now are.
The Charter on Basic Rights was adopted as a solemn proclamation in 2002.
At that time, there were several persons feeling sceptical about the suitability of
creating a legally binding norm system on basic rights within the EU. And thus
the Charter remained a political declaration. In Finland, too, there were suspi-
cions relating to the circumstance that a legally binding charter might reinforce
the authority of the Union. And in addition to that, the question of the relation be-
tween the Charter and the basic rights provisions in the Finnish Constitution, and
the question of the relationship between the Charter and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, was raised.
Since the Charter was adopted, these issues were further discussed in Europe.
A conference on issues relating to enlarging the scope of basic rights within the
EU was organized in Helsinki in 2002. This seminar and other similar subse-
quent discussions have in my opinion considerably contributed to overcoming
scepticism about reinforcing the legal position of the Charter and about EU sup-
port to the Human Rights Convention. The thought according to which the Char-
ter and its adoption were competing or somehow excluding each other was grad-
ually abandoned. The Convention working group on basic rights was surpris-
ingly unanimous on these issues and wanted the Convention to proceed in both
areas.
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In Finland, too, it was concluded that the goals of the EU Charter on Basic
Rights and the adoption of the Convention on Human Rights by the EU are in
part two different things. The Charter aims at reinforcing the position of basic
rights in the legislative work and other activities of the Union and at clarifying
the fundamental rights recognized by the Union. This is connected to the devel-
opment of the Union as a political system that ever more extensively takes care of
tasks previously falling within the scope of the member states and ever more ex-
tensively affecting citizens’ everyday life. The comprehensive task of the Char-
ter is to reinforce the civil dimension and democratic legitimacy of the Union and
to guarantee that civil rights be protected in Community law as well.
The adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights by the EU will
also promote the scope of the Union as far as Human Rights are concerned, as the
Union and its bodies will be affected by the external supervisory system of the
Convention after adoption. The purpose of adoption, however, partly differs
from the goals of the Charter. Firstly, adoption serves as a signal to the outside
world, declaring that the Union will commit itself to general European and uni-
versal Human Rights norms. Secondly, the external supervisory system of the
Convention will ultimately guarantee the protection of Human Rights in the ap-
plication of Community law as well. In this respect the Charter and its adoption
perform partly different functions. They shall thus be considered two different
methods of reinforcing the protection of Basic Rights, rather complementing
than excluding each other.
In this respect I consider we can be satisfied with the final result of the Con-
vention. I consider it particularly important that the Union will adopt the Con-
vention on Human Rights, as this is necessary in order to guarantee that a uni-
form interpretation of Human Rights be secured.
2. The Integration of Criminal Legislation in Europe
Another important theme in the debate on the future of the EU, from the point of
view of the Ministry of Justice, is of course the development of co-operation in
questions of legislation and domestic policy.
The transition to supranational co-operation, however, is not taking place
without problems. As the member states transfer certain authorities in police af-
fairs and penal co-operation to the Union, the definition of Union powers be-
comes a crucial question. Questions of competence are pertinent to penal issues,
since these are closely linked to the sovereignty of the member states. We must
have a clear conception of the powers the member states transfer to the Union
and the powers that remain within the member states.
These fundamental questions play a crucial role particularly when speaking
of the unification of substantive criminal law. Considering the goals of the Un-
ion, there is a certain need for harmonizing penal provisions. However, since we
are dealing with the essence of the penal system in the member states, it is neces-
sary to restrict harmonization to those questions where it can be virtually useful.
Generally speaking, more ambitious harmonization may be considered justified
2
mainly dealing with serious crime, crossing borders. A list of such offences was
proposed in the conclusions from the 1999 European Council Meeting at
Tampere.
There are also other tendencies in the Convention. The Commission in partic-
ular promotes a definition of Union powers enabling the Union to harmonize pe-
nal regulations in all policy areas within the Union, in case this is considered nec-
essary in order to achieve Government goals. The problem in this proposal is that
the penal authority of the Union is intended to be covering the whole scope of ap-
plication of the Constitutional Treaty. The powers are not merely intended to
cover serious transnational crime. Instead, harmonization might include insig-
nificant criminal acts as well. According to the Finnish opinion, such an unclear
definition of powers should not be adopted. Why is it not sufficient to the execu-
tion of Union legislation that the member states in accordance with the principle
of fidelity are obliged to guarantee effective sanctions? If the purpose is to guar-
antee that serious international offences, as for instance environmental offences,
are to be included in penal harmonization in some particular policy areas, the Un-
ion powers relating to these offences are to be confirmed in the Constitutional
Treaty.
3. In Conclusion
A crucial matter for penal policy decision-making is that decisions shall be based
on facts, reliable research, and that decision-makers shall be constantly interact-
ing with experts and practical workers in the field. The fruitful interaction be-
tween the Finnish Ministry of Justice and the scientific community is, among
other things, reflected in the fact that about half of the Finnish lecturers at this
Congress are working in scientific research or other fields of the Ministry of Jus-
tice. I hope the debates at the seminar will be productive and rewarding. How-





Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Norway
Dear participants,
Most of us here in this room are from other countries than Finland. Therefore; we
need to know where we are. Not from a tourist’s point of view. Not about the
thousand lakes and the deep forests. But maybe about the deep souls of the Finns,
and their bloody history. At least about their history. Far back in time, this coun-
try was a part of Sweden, then from 1809 a part of Russia, then, in 1918, divided
in a bloody civil war, after that a sprinkle of fascism, then two fierce wars against
Russia, a small one against Germany, and then a long, tense period under the eyes
of Stalin. The best political protection in this period was to become fully inte-
grated in the Nordic block. And so they did—also when it came to penal matters.
Traditionally, their penal system was a Russian one. They sent many prisoners
to Siberia, but had also a great prison population at home. Up to the 1960s they
had several hundred prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. They were Eastern Euro-
pean in their penal policy. But then, by political and moral reasons, they changed
their system and got their number of prisoners down to one fourth of the level it
had been most of the time since the civil war in 1918. Today, Finland is solidly
placed among Scandinavian countries with 66 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants.
The leading troika behind this ethically and politically based action consisted of
Inkeri Anttila, Patrik Törnudd and K. J. Lång. They proved that prison figures are
not a result of destiny, but of choice. We are free. Free to choose and change.
But are we not forced, by the crime situation?
In my view, crime is an unsuitable point of departure when we discuss penal mat-
ters. Crime is all, and nothing. Acts with the potentiality of being seen as crimes
are like an unlimited natural resource. We can take out a little amount in the form
of crime—or a lot. Crime is in endless supply. Acts are not, they become, their
meanings are created as they occur to us. With this view, it is probably clear that I
am not particularly fond of comparative studies of crime figures and victim fig-
ures.
This opens for a rarely discussed problem: How much of the unwanted acts in
a society should we take out in the form of crime? What is a suitable amount of
crime, both when it comes to the occurrence of unwanted acts, and when it comes
to the amount of these unwanted acts to be designated as crimes and therefore be-
longing to the institution of penal law? And related to this: What is a suitable size
of the penal sector? I discuss criteria for this in a book soon to be published, but
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can not use my 30 minutes here to a discussion of these criteria. It must be suffi-
cient to say, that sometimes, intuitively, we feel that some countries let their pe-
nal apparatus expand much too much. It is simply ethically wrong to deliver so
much pain. And it hurts the civil character of these societies. Some states are so
punitive that it hurts both them and us.
My problem in what follows is therefore: What to say in such cases, can we
shame states out of it? I will mention three cases.
To visit the first case, we can just leave this room and go to the main railway
station of Helsinki, take a beer in the beautiful railway restaurant—Bertolt
Brecht did some of his writing here—and then, some hours in the train bound
eastwards and you are in a country with close to 600 prisoners per 100,000 inhab-
itants—nine to ten times the Scandinavian level. Russia is the major incarcerator
in Europe, with Belarus as the next in line. Russia today is a country completely
out of line with Europe when it comes to the number of prisoners.
But important parts of the Russian intelligentsia want their country to be part
of Western Europe. Visitors are invited to observe and to reveal their observa-
tions. The Russian prison administration is exceptionally open and self critical.
As one of these visitors, I get some of the same feeling as when visiting Finland
in the former days, in meeting a culture where it is uncomfortable to experience
oneself as in too great a distance to common European standards. It is with con-
siderable embarrassment, from the very top and down, that Russians reveal the
total size of their prison population and also the conditions in their remand pris-
ons. My own theme while lecturing at universities or colleges in Russia is to
emphasise the urgent need for reduction of the number of prisoners. There is, I
say, no point in talks about psychological treatment or education in a system so
desperately overcrowded as the Russian one. It is just a cover-up. If Russia wants
to be an ordinary part of Europe, it must also be so when it comes to their prison
population.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the same situation. They want to come
close to Scandinavia, there is just some water that divides us, and much in the
culture is similar. But the proximity builds on an illusion if they preserve a penal
apparatus belonging to another time and another culture. They all have more than
300 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. Can the general culture in a country re-
main uninfluenced by being that punitive? One might also expect that countries
with such a huge number of prisoners will create perfect growth conditions for
highly unwanted subcultures. People trained in this type of subcultures, and I
have here both prison guards and prisoners in mind, will not be the most wel-
come ambassadors for their countries when they visit the Scandinavia they are
supposed to stand so close to.
The embarrassment among many officials in Eastern Europe, particularly in
Russia, has another side: It is today with considerable pride some of them report
on the reduction of their prison population, particularly in their remand prisons.
This development is a manifestation of that part of Europe coming closer to Eu-
rope. In this reduction is once again illustrated that prison figures are not shaped
by crime, but by the general culture.
But these reductions are far from stabilised. Two wars threaten prison reduc-
tions in Russia. First, the war in Chechnya and all the violence directly and indi-
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rectly connected to this war. Secondly the war against drugs. Penal reformers are
not the only visitors to Russia. Drug experts also go there. I have spent depress-
ing hours in the Duma, listening to a parliamentarian with much power who de-
scribed the importance of protecting the Russian youth against drugs. It will de-
velop into an epidemic, he said. One user drags ten newcomers into the habit, and
so it will continue. Severe punishment becomes a necessity to stop this epidemic
spreading. I had heard it before. The lost war against drugs in the West is now
dangerously close to be repeated in the East, with predictable results.
Nonetheless, the situation in the greatest incarcerator in Europe is not without
hope. The increase in the number of prisoners has come to a stop, a considerable
reduction can be observed, there exists a willingness to discuss the problems, and
the atmosphere makes an open discussion of these matters possible.
* * *
Cuba is my next case. Last term, I spent some days lecturing there; we have an
agreement of co-operation between Cuba and our institute in Oslo. Usually, I get
to know a country through its penal system, but that was not particularly easy in
this case. I did not get access to any of their prisons. And their prison figures are
state secrets, just as in the Soviet Union back in time. But of course, the USSR
figures were not impossible to estimate. I have described the basis for my esti-
mates in Crime Control as Industry (Christie 2000). When it comes to the Cuban
situation, I used the same methods, but there are miserable holes in my knowl-
edge. I can offer only rough estimates.
Even so, I feel pretty sure that Cuba belongs to the category of countries with a
very high rate of incarceration. My estimate is that they now, in 2003, probably
have between 454 and 545 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. These are large
numbers in a Caribbean connection. The figures have probably tripled since
1987. Cuba also has, this spring, executed three prisoners. For many years they
have had a moratorium on capital punishment.
Compared to most states close to them, Cuba has a highly developed welfare
system for the most vulnerable part of the population. No illiteracy, no children
sleeping in the streets. And they have a hospital system so well developed that the
most conservative among Norwegian parliamentarians come home after visits
and tell that we have much to learn from Cuba. Nonetheless, external pressure
and internal differentiation take their toll. A vulnerable state bites, and a frus-
trated population tolerates these bites.
In addition comes the rigidity created by secrecy. With prison figures as state
secrets, it is not easy to initiate any discussion there on these matters. Secrecy
also makes difficult any criticism of the inner working of the system.
How to approach this problem?
My attempt was the old one, to compare ideals with practice.
Cuba has ideals of creating an egalitarian society. It has ideals close to those in
Scandinavian welfare states. It has a tradition of close contact between trade un-
ions in Cuba and Scandinavia. But what happens with these ideals, when a state
acquires an exceptionally large prison population?
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I was not invited into any Cuban prison. But based on observation from large
prisons in countries with some similarities to Cuba, I could at least suggest how
such prisons usually develop: With such a large number of prisoners, and with a
system growing so quickly, prisons will obviously be large and overpopulated.
They will have relatively few prison guards. This means that the prisoners them-
selves will rule the inner life of the prisons. This will lead to the development of a
hierarchical system among the inmates. At the top will be a king, surrounded by
his court. At their service will stand a group of thugs, controlling prisoners of
lower ranks. At the bottom will be the untouchables, those relegated to menial
tasks, eventually functioning as prostitutes for the better off. A caste system—in
extreme contrast to what Cuba strives to create for the society as a whole.
To preserve an egalitarian welfare state, this state has developed a system that
is a negation of the ideals that the authorities strive to attain. It cannot in the long
run be useful. It will become a danger to the fundamental values of that society.
* * *
I have conveyed this view to those in Cuba willing to listen. But I come from Nor-
way, a small nation with considerable freedom of expression. With this back-
ground, am I not then obliged to confront Cuba with their limitations on these
same freedoms, particularly these last months? Would it not be right first and
foremost to scold them for their imprisonment of political opponents?
My preference is to start at the other end, with ordinary prisoners. Imprison-
ment of political opponents is part of a political culture. That political culture is
connected to the penal culture. States with large prison populations are in the
habit of using that measure. The best way to reduce the use of imprisonment
against political opponents is to minimise the use of imprisonment in general.
The barriers against using imprisonment against political opponents become less
solid where imprisonment is exceptionally frequently used. The barrier against
using capital punishment against political opponents is likewise less solid in
countries where killing is used extensively against those seen as “ordinary crimi-
nals”. So also with torture. I respect that some might be of the opinion that I ought
to talk loudly and confront the one-party states with all their deviations from hu-
man rights in general and Norwegian standards in particular. But I will not. That
is to start at the wrong end.
* * *
Compared to the old USSR and now Cuba, the USA is like an open book. Prison
figures are easily available and clearly presented. There were big headlines in the
US newspapers when their prison figures in June 2002 passed the two million
mark and also in 2003 when one hundred thousand more were added. Perhaps
this openness reflects some of the problem?
Basically, it seems as if their enormous prison population is not a source of
shame. It is seen as a sort of inevitable answer to crime, if anything, a sign of
strength and efficiency.
To me, the US penal system is a system that negates the fundamental values
they claim as their own. It is an open society. Nobody censures my speech. I can
move freely. I am even invited back. But what goes on in their penal system for
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2.1 million prisoners, and for the additional 4.7 million on probation and parole,
has long since passed the level of what can be understood as reflecting their val-
ues. It is materially the wealthiest country in the world. Nonetheless, it is a coun-
try that uses prisons instead of welfare. It is a country that continuously talks
about freedom. Nonetheless, it has the largest prison population in the world,
both in absolute and relative figures. It is a country that fought a fierce civil war in
which the abolition of slavery was at least some of the motivation. Nonetheless,
it has an abnormal proportion of black people within its prison walls. It is a coun-
try with great emphasis on sociability. Nonetheless, an exceptional number of
their prisoners live under conditions of such an amount of isolation that nothing
compares (King 1999). It is a country that emphasises limits to state power.
Nonetheless, it has an enormous number of employees to keep that state power at
a maximum, both at a federal and state level. In sum, it is a country that uses ex-
clusion instead of inclusion, and in addition executes a portion of the most un-
wanted. Or, in the title of a forthcoming book by Johathan Simon, it is a country
that is Governing through Crime.
Their penal policy represents a threat against human values in their own coun-
try. But also abroad this penal policy is a danger, through its model power. Parlia-
mentarians from my country go to N.Y. to learn about zero tolerance. They are
not alone in going. The danger is that it is we, the critical ones, who will be
shamed into conformity with US standards.
* * *
How to behave in this situation? Should one, with some knowledge of prison
matters, keep away from professional visits to a nation with this extensive penal
apparatus? This is not my opinion. Of course, we should never cut off contact
with those with whom we disagree.
On the contrary, we should go more often. But an absolute condition for pro-
fessional visits to an open society as the US, must be a clear exposure of dis-
agreement with their penal policy. It is necessary to expose that, seen from
abroad, it is difficult to understand that the abnormal size of the US penal system
does not become the completely dominant theme for colleagues in the US. It is
difficult to understand why the very existence of this system does not become the
dominant theme at their various professional meetings—and remain so until the
US penal system is normalised. And the huge research foundations—The
Rockefeller Foundation, The Ford Foundation—where are they when they do
not see the challenge of bringing the inner workings of their state in order? How
is it that nearly all professional groups within the universities and within the pris-
ons do not convert to activist groups to change the US system into normality?
I would not necessarily be so open in my criticism when visiting totalitarian
states. Clear talk, particularly clear public talk, might lead to immediate loss of
contact. And it might bring our opposite numbers in such countries into serious
trouble, sometimes danger. In prison research or in research on various forms of
unacceptable behaviour, we all know well that we have an obligation to protect our
sources. But so is also the case when our sources are persons who work in states
where they might be severely punished. Visiting such states demands more self-
censorship than visiting the US. I believe this difference is to the pride of the US.
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I know, of course I know, that a great number of US colleagues, perhaps the
majority, share many of these views on the US penal system. Many speak out, but
feel at the same time completely powerless. Their critical potential is weakened
by the fact that they live in a society that is not particularly interested in listening
to other nations, to come closer to their standards. They are the standards. It is for
that reason they can make their prison figures public. With pride. It is not difficult
to understand that many US colleagues give in, shy away from blaming their sys-
tem for its horrors.
So, I will not shame my US colleagues, I think they need more comfort than
pain. But I will use them as a sign of warning. For Western Europe. It seems clear
to me: We might soon follow. There are more criminologists in the US. But Eu-
rope is on the same track.
Two developments are clear. First, Europe is adapting to modern times in de-
velopments inside the system of punishment. The number of prisoners is on the
increase. England and Wales have reached the Eastern European level when it
comes to prisoners, with 129 per 100,000. France has increased to 99. The Neth-
erlands is a lost case. Even Finland has begun climbing, from 60 in 2001 to 66 in
2002.
And then to my second point which has to do with the possibilities for aca-
demic criticism of this development. It sounds so impractical what criminolo-
gists can say on the political arena, so much against the spirit of our time. We cen-
sor ourselves so as not to feel completely out of tune. And then, of particular im-
portance, we have students in need of work. More theoretical knowledge about
crime and crime control is not of obvious importance for the jobs our students
will apply for and will not necessarily be received with enthusiasm by those who
are to recruit them.
Criminology, also in Europe, is at present trapped in its own success. Jobs for
researchers are dependent on jobs for students, which depend on the type of
training that makes them useful for jobs in the very institutions we are profes-
sionally equipped to raise questions about. Stan Cohen was right in his warnings
in“Against Criminology”.
The particular danger in this situation is that it all happens at the very same
time when the universities are converting to market institutions. When we need
them most, the protective shields are taken away. From a theoretical point of
view, the whole development is a fascinating confirmation of the power of the
one-dimensional market oriented society. From the perspective among those of
us with a strong wish for preserving room for free criticism, it is a most alarming
development.
Come out of the ivory tower, say so many. But we are out. Let us come in
again, would be my answer. At a minimum, let us also have the ivory tower. We
cannot only be out. Distance is a necessity to see the whole perspective and to be-
come useful to our societies in a more fundamental way.
I thank you for your attention.
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Crime Control and Integration
Paul Wiles
Director, Research, Development & Statistics,
Home Office, UK
Nils and I have known each other for a long time. Once—and since he still ap-
pears so young and vigorous I won’t embarrass him by revealing how many years
ago, but let’s just say we were both young men—I was driving Nils through Lon-
don. At one point Nils gazed round the great metropolis and said “I wonder how
they deal with the sewerage?”. Well, we’ve spent much of our lives worrying
about policies that tried to label some human behaviour as “sewerage”, and re-
sisting policies that regarded them as just as easy to get rid of. We did so because
we shared a set of ideals about what was possible from human association and
how it could be best achieved. Let us just call them “enlightenment ideals”. They
were important to us because they represented the good side of European culture,
stood in opposition to its dark side, and underlay much of the corpus of what we
now think of classical European criminology. One of the founding fathers of
British criminology—Professor Sir Leon Radzinowicz—in his last speech to the
British Society of Criminology just before he died—berated us for having for-
gotten that those ideals should be at the heart of our work. And Nils Christie has
just pointed to the same danger.
I do not believe that we have abandoned these ideals. I think that in spite of our
differences they still lie at the heart of common European culture. I want to take a
slightly different look at the problem than Nils—the practical politics of future
reform in Europe—in which figures about crime do play a part, and will do so
whether we like it or not.
In the past the enlightenment ideals were owned by a governing liberal elite.
In Britain, for example, up until the mid-1980’s, penal policy was driven by such
a liberal elite consensus—all the more surprising because ministers often faced
outright hostility from their own political supporters for maintaining this con-
sensus. We can not ignore the fact that some policies were only sustained in con-
tradiction to mass opinion and not because they had widespread public support. I
doubt, for example, that in the UK we would have abolished the use of capital
punishment if it had been left to the popular will—or, at the very least, it would
have been much more difficult to do so. But things have changed. Most European
countries now have democracies governed by rotating political groups whose
claim to power increasingly rests on their ability to represent and mobilise mass
public opinion.
Of course, none of us have direct democracy—we all have some form of rep-
resentative democracy. The job of our elected politicians is not simply to reflect
mass opinion, but to lead and persuade their electorates of the policies that
should be pursued. Nevertheless, political groups can not totally deny public
opinion without risking being excluded from exercising power. A key element is
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that politicians have to convince the public that they are in touch with and under-
stand their experience—or for reasons I want to explore in a moment—that they
are not ignoring the public’s perceptions of the nature of the crime problem. The
present governing political party in Britain spent many years out of power, in part
it is sometimes argued because they seemed to espouse a romanticised view of
criminality at odds with public perceptions and feelings. The consequence is that
whilst the basic principle of the enlightenment ideal might remain, how they are
to be interpreted and applied to current problems is now a matter of complex and
on-going dialogue with the public. Both principles and penal policies in demo-
cratic societies will develop in response to changes both in the nature of crime
and the perceived threat it presents to the public. One of the commonest com-
plaints against the European Union is that neither the Commission nor the Parlia-
ment have this kind of direct democratic responsiveness. The result is that we can
no longer rely simply on the opinion of an educated, liberal political elite to de-
liver the kind of policies that Nils desires—even if they represent our views and
even if we believe our expertise ought to carry a special standing in this regard.
In modern mass democracies we have to be prepared to contemplate changes
in our penal policies and that in the debates about such changes we will have to
engage a broader public. Enlightenment ideals do not prescribe a particular penal
policy but rather a set of general principles from which policies can be derived.
How those principles are interpreted as the basis for policy can be the subject of
legitimate debate as can the relevance of empirical evidence for such decisions.
In trying to inform such debates we will have to be able to demonstrate the rele-
vance of our ideas and evidence to the experience of crime of our fellow citizens.
If criminology in Europe can not speak outside of the academy then we will fail
to influence the future direction of European penal policy.
The general theme for this third conference of the European Society of Crimi-
nology is “Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating Europe”. Nils has already
set out some philosophical benchmarks for us. Other plenary speakers will be
looking closely at the detailed evidence for how far our experience of crime is a
common one, at recent trends in the politics of crime and penal policy and at the
implications of the emerging, new constitutional framework for the European
Union.
I want to address a slightly different issue to Nils—namely, how penal policies
might develop in a Europe in which mass democratic engagement will be a domi-
nant theme in each of our separate countries—and in which there is increasing
pressure for such engagement at the level of the European Union.
The current position as regards penal policies across Europe does show varia-
tions in crime and the response to crime. I suspect that if Nils wished to use statis-
tics to produce a catalogue of infamy then my own country would come out, in
his eyes, as in need of a dose of re-integrative shaming. (Figure 1) For example, if
we look at the size of the prison populations in Europe then England & Wales
presently has the highest imprisonment rate per head of population of any EU
country and higher than many other European countries.
However, we may need to look beyond this particular statistic. I suspect, for
example, that my Ministers might want to look not just at the imprisonment rate
per head of population but also the imprisonment rate per recorded crime. (Fig-
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ure 2). They might argue that their penal policies have to respond to the crime
problem they are facing. After all the recorded crime figures inevitably frame the
debate on penal policy in each country. As you can see looked at this way the pic-
ture does change somewhat. Since the recorded crime rates vary significantly be-
tween European countries (Figure 3) then one could argue that different coun-
tries might reasonably develop different penal strategies. The recorded crime
data shows very significant variations in both level and mix of crime between dif-
ferent European countries and some support for these variations is provided by
the ICVS. But we don’t really know how far the differences are an artefact of re-
cording practices between different countries, which in turn could culturally af-
fect responses to a victim survey.
We do know that the ratio of the rate of household and personal crimes re-
ported through the ICVS and recorded crime rate varies very significantly be-
tween European countries (Figure 3). On the face of it it seems that some coun-
tries simply record more crime than others.
The ICVS suggests that people in different countries have broadly similar
views about what constitutes a crime and their relative seriousness. This, in prin-
ciple, ought to lead to a communality of desire to report to the police. However,
the same survey also shows that trust in the police and confidence that it is worth
reporting a crime to them also varies between countries (Figure 4). Furthermore,
such differences can themselves also vary over time. To take the specific English
experience we know, from the British Crime Survey, that the willingness to re-
port crime to the police has varied over the last 20 years’from a low point of 36%
to a high point of 44%. We also know that the police recording of the crimes re-






























































































































Figure 1. Rate of prison population per 100,000 population in 2002
rates of both reporting and recording have been increasing in England over the
last twenty years. In other words, regardless of what is happening to actual
crimes the rates of both reporting and recording have been adding an artificial in-
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Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey























































Figure 3. Comparison of incident victimisation rate in 1989 and recorded crime
levels for serious offences in 2001
We also know that there are differences in the way in which crime is recorded
in different countries. For example, in some countries a crime is recorded at the
point when a victim reports a crime to the police but in others at the point of arrest
or charge. And there is also considerable variation in the range of things which
the police routinely record. In my own country we have recently significantly in-
creased the range of events recorded as crimes. First, in 1998, we changed the
counting rules the police have to follow when they decide whether to record an
event reported to them by the public as a crime. The new rules, for example,
meant that the police were instructed to record all minor violence to the extent
than now about half of all our recorded violent crime actually involved no physi-
cal injury to anyone! The effect of these changes in the counting rules was to in-
flate the overall crime count by 14%. Then in 2001 we additionally introduced a
new National Crime Recording Standard. This was done because we knew that
not all police forces were recording crime in the same way—in simple terms
some police were recording a crime as long as someone claimed to be a victim,
whilst others only did so if there was evidence to support the claim. The new
Standard requires all police forces to record a crime as long as there is no evi-
dence to contradict what is being reported to them. The effect of this new Stan-
dard, together with the previous change in the counting rules, has been to inflate
the overall crime count by just over 25%. Such changes have been driven by the
best of public policy considerations. First, by a desire that all crimes—no matter
how trivial—should be recorded so that the government is clear about the total
scale of the problem. Second, by a desire for a more victim-focused criminal jus-
tice system driven by victim-led recording. Third, by a desire for greater unifor-
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Figure 4. Comparison of respondents feeling police are helpful to percentage of
offences reported to the police 1999
different police forces: you can’t performance manage the police if they are all
recording crime differently. Finally, so that all of this will make the police more
visibly accountable for how well they deal with crime. All of these reasons are
quite laudable in themselves but the effect has been to inflate recording of crime
by a quarter and, as I have explained, this was on top of an increasing trend for the
public to report incidents to the police.
Once we adjust statistically for these inflationary recording changes then
crime in England and Wales has been falling for the last six or seven years. This
fall is also confirmed by the British Crime Survey, which is now one of the largest
victim surveys in the world and conducted on a rolling continuous basis. We now
have the lowest risk of victimisation in England and Wales for twenty years. The
trend is, of course, broadly similar to the trends in many European countries and
in North America.
Nevertheless, counting more crime has political implications. In spite of the
fact that the risk of victimisation is at its lowest level for twenty years 73% of the
public in England and Wales believe that crime has been increasing.
The government has explained that the increase in recorded crime is simply an
artefact of changes in recording practices but the press have by no means been
prepared to report such explanations. I have personally briefed every journalist
of every newspaper, radio station and television channel who reports on crime
and on what these statistics mean. Yet most of the media have continued to report
the statistics as showing a real increase in crime. On the day we reported that the
risk of women being the victim of violence was at the lowest level for many
years, one national newspaper nevertheless had its front page entirely covered
with the faces of women who had suffered violent crime. Sometimes such
miss-reporting has a more amusing side. On the day we published the last crime
statistics in England the Daily Telegraph had a cartoon of me on the front page
calling for help and saying “Please someone come and help me, I’ve just fright-
ened myself to death looking at the crime statistics”! But such miss-reporting has
real effects—we know, for example, that those who read the more sensational
British tabloid press are more likely to think that crime has been increasing.
However, such beliefs, whether fanned by the media or not, have real political
consequences. They place great pressure on a democratic government to be seen
to be responding. Here is the ultimate irony. A government wanting to improve
its recorded crime statistics for sensible, almost high-minded reasons can find
that it rebounds as pressure to adopt a tougher law and order response to an imag-
ined problem.
The first effect of recording more crimes is that other common measures of an
effective criminal justice also look poor—because the denominator is being in-
flated. For example, police clear-up rates are often used as a measure of police ef-
fectiveness yet recording more crime produces a poor clear-up rate even for the
same level of actual clear-ups. This further undermines confidence in a criminal
justice system and puts further pressure on a government to be seen to be taking
action.
One result in the case of England—as my first slide illustrated—has been to
increase our prison population to a level where it is now the highest per capita
rate in the EU. As you can imagine, we have been looking very closely at why the
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prison population has risen in this way. We know that the increase has been
driven by both a rise in the rate of incarceration and in the average sentence
length, with the latter being particularly problematic for the size of prison popu-
lation. However, we also know that most of this increase can not be accounted for
by changes in sentencing law or penal legislation. In other words, most of this in-
crease was not the consequence of a considered policy shift emanating from Par-
liament or Ministers. Rather the change has been driven by a change in the be-
haviour of judges within a climate of general political debate which has been
dominated by the perceived increase in crime and demands for tougher criminal
justice responses. Our judiciary may be constitutionally autonomous but they
have been very responsive to the public mood and the political debate.
We also, of course, know that England is by no means unique in Europe in in-
creasing its prison population. Furthermore, such changes are more global and
are not unconnected to changes in recorded crime. The irony, by the way, is that
England has had a falling recorded crime rate once adjustments have been made
for the changes in recording practices I have already explained. However, you
now know that the political debate in England was actually taking place largely
on the premise that crime was increasing at an alarming rate and this was be-
lieved to be the case by most of the public. You will know whether the same prob-
lem has been present in other European countries.
Now I am not claiming that, in England, a misunderstanding about recorded
crime has been solely responsible for our increasing use of prison or the general
trend of our penal policy. Even though overall crime has been declining, and
mass property crime such as burglary and car crime have particularly declined,
there has also been an increase in some direct contact crime, such as street rob-
bery or mugging and also in some limited kinds of serious violence. It is also the
case that after the collapse in Britain of a liberal political consensus about crime
policy, which I described earlier, law and order has played a central role in subse-
quent British election campaigns and has become almost a touchstone for the
electability of a political party. However, worries about order and the basis for
social trust have also been present in most late modern societies and debates
about crime and penal policy are often used to symbolise these broader concerns.
The irony that I am pointing to is that these concerns have co-existed with an-
other trend of late modern societies—namely, the extension of formally rational
management techniques into the public sector, by devices such as target setting
and performance management. Such techniques rely upon more detailed and ac-
curate information flows than were required in the past. In Britain, we have been
collecting national recorded crime statistics since the 1860s and they were origi-
nally put in place at a time when there was a similar concern for improving the
performance of public services. In nineteenth century Britain, as in many other
European countries, statistical collections were often used as the basis to drive
reform. They were not so central, however, when there was a broad consensus
about penal policy. Now they are again at the heart of the debate about reforming
public services and penal policy.
Until recently we collected national crime statistics twice a year and then only
down to police force level. Now we are collecting such data every month, seven
days after the end of the month, and at an increasingly localised level. Such man-
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agement techniques have been particularly explored by the British government
but they are simply examples of a much broader trend in the rationality of admin-
istration.
If I am correct then Nils’s plea for more enlightened penal policies in not go-
ing to be easy to achieve. It will have to be argued for as part of a mass discourse
about the nature of contemporary societies and how they can best be governed.
The context for that debate will be a general concern about trust and security,
heightened by immediate worries about terrorism, migration and global forms of
crime. In order to respond to such concerns in terms of delivery of public ser-
vices—and especially in the crucial areas of maintaining order and managing
crime—governments will turn to ever more formally rational management tech-
niques to try and drive up the quality and accountability of service delivery in the
hope of rebuilding public trust. However, these very techniques will, at least ini-
tially, reveal the problems in more detail than in the past and radically increase
the demand for penal policies to address people’s detailed and immediate crime
problems. People do want answers to global threats and they want policing to
maintain a high level of order and civility in their own neighbourhoods. The big-
gest threat to the enlightenment values that Nils cherishes is that European states
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In April and May 1995 the columns of The New York Review of Books were sub-
ject to a remarkable and, some would say, acrimonious debate. It was an argu-
ment which was, to my mind, one of the most significant examples of academic
whistle-blowing, wide ranging in its critique, apposite in its target and reasoning,
timely and badly needed yet falling, as we shall see, on stony ground.
On one side of this skirmish was Richard Lewontin, Professor of Zoology at
Harvard, a distinguished geneticist and epidemiologist, on the other a team of so-
ciologists led by Edward Laumann and John Gagnon from the University of Chi-
cago, who had recently published The Social Organisation of Sexuality (1995),
and its popular companion volume Sex in America: A Definitive Survey (1995).
On the sides, chipping in with gusto, Richard Sennett, joint Professor of Sociol-
ogy at the LSE and NYU.
This debate is of interest because it represents a direct confrontation of natural
science with sociology or social science, as it is often hopefully and optimisti-
cally called. Such encounters are relatively rare and tend to occur when particu-
larly politically distasteful findings are presented to the public as cast iron and
embellished with the primatur of science. A recent example of this was the publi-
cation of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve (1994), ac-
companied by pages of statistical tables which purported to present the scientific
evidence for the link between race, IQ and, indeed, crime. At that time many
prominent scientists including Steven Rose, Stephen Gould were moved to inter-
vene but normally the walls between disciplines remain intact: Indeed a collegial
atmosphere of mutual respect coupled with lack of interest ensures that parallel
and contradictory literatures about the same subject can occur in departments
separated sometimes by a corridor or, more frequently, a faculty block. In the
case of the natural and social sciences this is complicated by a unidirectional ad-
miration—a one-sided love affair, one might say—or at least a state of acute
physics envy—between the aspiring social scientist and the natural sciences. Be
that as it may, a considerable proportion of sociologists, the vast majority of psy-
chologists and an increasing number of criminologists embrace, without thought
or reservation, a positivistic path. Namely, that natural scientific methods can be
applied to human action, that behaviour is causally determined, that incontest-
able objectivity is attainable and that precise quantitative measurement is possi-
ble, and indeed preferable. In the case of criminology, this entails the belief that
the crimes of individuals can be predicted from risk factors and that rates of
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crime can be explained by the changes in the proportion of causal factors in the
population.
Richard Lewontin sets out to review the two books. They arose on the back of
the AIDS crisis and the need to understand the epidemiology of its spread. The
survey was eventually well funded by the research foundations, was conducted
by NORC, the premiere social survey research organisation in North America.
The project involved a sample of 3,432 people representing 200 million post-pu-
bertal Americans. Just for a minute let us think of the audacity of the sample sur-
vey—and this one was more thoroughgoing than most—to claim to generalise
from such a small number to such a large population of individuals. Lewontin’s
critique is on two levels, one the problem of representativeness and two—and
more substantially—the problem of truth.
Let us first of all examine the problem of representation. An initial criticism is
that the random sample was not actually from the total population. It is based on a
sample of addresses drawn from the census, but it excluded households where
there were no English speakers nor anyone between the ages of 15–59. Most cru-
cially it excludes the 3% of Americans (some 7.5 million) who do not live in
households because they are institutionalised or are homeless. This latter point
is, as Lewontin indicates, scarcely trivial in understanding the epidemiology of
AIDS as it excludes the most vulnerable group in the population, including those
likely to be victims of homosexual rape in prison, prostitution, reckless drug use,
the sexually ‘free’ college-aged adolescents etc. The random sample is not,
therefore, drawn from the population as a whole: a very atypical population is
omitted. Such a restriction in population sampled is a usual preliminary in survey
research.
However, once this somewhat restricted sample was made, the research team
did not stint in their efforts to get as large a response rate as possible. After re-
peated visits, telephone calls and financial inducements ranging from $10 to
$100, the result was a response rate of 79%—of which they were duly pleased.
But, as Lewontin points out: ‘It is almost always the case that those who do not
respond are a non-random sample of those who are asked’ (1995a, 28). In this
case it could well be prudishness, but in the case of other surveys equally
non-random causes of non-responses. For example, in our own experience of
over fifteen large-scale crime and victimisation studies which we ran at The Cen-
tre for Criminology, Middlesex University (see for example Jones et al, 1986;
Crawford et al, 1990) we made every effort to reduce non-response but never
managed better than 83%. Indeed, criminal victimisation surveys as a whole
have between one-fifth to a quarter of respondents whose victimisation is un-
known. As I remarked at the time, in the thick of quantitative research:
‘It goes without saying that such a large unknown population could easily
skew every finding we victimologists present. At the most obvious level, it
probably includes a disproportionate number of transients, of lower working
class people hostile to officials with clipboards attempting to ask them about
their lives, and of those who are most frightened to answer the door because of
fear of crime.’ (Young, 1988: 169).
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Even panel studies which follow a given population over time suffer from this
problem. To take the famous Seattle Social Development Project as an example
(see Farrington et al, 2003). This is a prospective longitudinal survey of 808 chil-
dren. To start with, these are the children/parents who consented to be included
out of the population of 1,053 fifth-grade students targeted—that is, it has a 70%
response rate from the outset—with 30% refusing consent. Secondly, youths
dropped out over time so, for example, by the age of 12 the sample fell to 52%.
There is, of course, every reason to suspect that those who initially did not con-
sent and those who fell out of the panel might have different delinquency patterns
to those who consented and remained within the panel.
Lewontin’s first point is, therefore, clear and is as applicable to criminology as
to sociology. Let me at this point remind the reader of Quetelet’s warning.
Adolphe Quetelet, the founder of scientific statistics, and a pioneer in analysing
the social and physical determinants of crime, introduced into academic discus-
sion in the 1830s the problem of the unknown figure of crime. That is crime not
revealed in the official statistics:
‘This is also the place to examine a difficulty … it is that our observations can
only refer to a certain number of known and tried offenders out of the unknown
sum total of crimes committed. Since this sum total of crimes committed will
probably ever continue unknown, all the reasoning of which it is the basis will
be more or less defective. I do not hesitate to say, that all the knowledge which
we possess on the statistics of crimes and offences will be of no utility whatso-
ever, unless we admit without question that there is a ratio, nearly invariably
the same, between known and tried offences and the unknown sum total of
crimes committed. This ratio is necessary, and if it did not really exist, every-
thing which, until the present time, has been said on the statistical documents
of crime, would be false and absurd.’ (A. Quetelet, 1842: 82)
Quetelet’s fixed ratios are, of course, a pipe dream, as unlikely as they would be
convenient. His warning, written in 1835 (English translation 1842) has echoed
throughout the criminology academy for the last one hundred and seventy years.
If we do not know the true rate of crime all our theories are built on quicksand.
They will be of ‘no utility’, ‘false’, and indeed ‘absurd’. Legions of theorists
from Robert K. Merton through to James Q. Wilson have committed Giffen’s
paradox: expressing their doubts about the accuracy of the data and then pro-
ceeding to use the crime figures with seeming abandon, this is particularly true in
recent years when the advent of sophisticated statistical analysis is, somehow,
seen to grant permission to skate over the thin ice of insubstantiality (Giffen,
1965; Oosthoek, 1978). Others have put their faith in statistics generated by the
social scientist, whether self-report studies or victimisation surveys, as if
Quetelet’s warning no longer concerned them and the era of ‘pre-scientific’data
was over.
Indeed, Richard Sparks and his associates, in the introduction to their ground-
breaking British victimisation study, summarised the decade of American re-
search prior to their own with a note of jubilation: ‘Within a decade … some of
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the oldest problems of criminology have come at least within reach of a solution.’
(Sparks et al, 1977: 1). As we have seen, the problem of non-response means that
such a resolution of the age-old problem of measurement is not resolved. It
would be so, of course, if the non-respondents were just—or almost—like the re-
spondents and indeed such an excuse is often invoked with as much likelihood of
validity as Quetelet’s ratios. As it is, the atypicality of non-respondents is likely
to overturn the significance levels of any probabilistic sampling. Richard Sparks
was quite clear about this in his assessment of the potential of victimisation stud-
ies. His initial excitement became tempered by considerable caution. Thus he
writes, ten years later:
‘Much too much fuss is made, in practically all official NCS publications,
about statistical significance (i.e. allowance for sampling variability). A vari-
ety of standard errors and confidence intervals for NCS data are now rou-
tinely quoted in those publications. Yet it is clear that nonsampling error is of
far greater magnitude in the NCS; adjustments … may offset some of this
nonsampling error, though only in a ballpark way, which makes questions of
sampling variability virtually irrelevant. My own view (not shared by all) is
that if after commonsensical adjustment a trend or pattern appears which
makes some sense, then it ought not to be disregarded even if it does not attain
some magical level of statistical significance.’ (1981: 44, n. 42)
Telling the Truth?
But let us go on to Lewontin’s next criticism. And here the problem is even more
important and substantial than that of non-response and the dark figure. This re-
volves around the key question of whether those who responded to the question-
naire were in fact telling the truth. That is, that social surveys may not only have
dark figures of non-respondents, but a dark figure of non-response—and indeed
‘over-response’—amongst the respondents themselves.
It is rare for surveys of attitude or self-reported behaviour to have any internal
check as to validity. After all, if people say they would rather live by work than on
welfare, if they profess liberal attitudes on racial matters, or if they tell you that
they were assaulted twice last year, how is one to know that this is not true? One
may have one’s suspicions, of course, but there are few cast iron checks. Every
now and then, however, anomalies stare you in the face. In the case of this survey
there is a particularly blatant example. For the average number of heterosexual
partners reported by men over the last five years is 75% greater than the average
number reported by women. This is an obvious anomaly, it is, as Lewontin points
out, like a violation of the only law in economics that the number of sales must be
equal to the number of purchases. What is startling is that the researchers are well
aware of this. Indeed, they devote considerable time to debating for which of sev-
eral reasons this ‘discrepancy’ might have occurred and conclude that the most
likely explanation is that ‘either men may exaggerate or women may underesti-
mate’. As, Lewontin remarks,
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‘So in the single case where one can actually test the truth, the investigators
themselves think it most likely that people are telling themselves and others
enormous lies. If one takes the authors at their word, it would seem futile to
take seriously the other results of the study. The report that 5.3 percent of con-
ventional Protestants, 3.3 percent of fundamentalists, 2.8 percent of Catho-
lics, and 10.7 percent of the non-religious have ever had a same-sex partner
may show the effect of religion on practice or it may be nothing but hypocrisy.
What is billed as a study of “Sexual Practices in the United States” is, after
all, a study of an indissoluble jumble of practices, attitudes, personal myths,
and posturing.’ (1995a: 29)
What is of interest here is the awareness of thin ice, yet the ineluctable desire to
keep on skating. Just as with Giffen’s paradox, where the weakness of the statis-
tics is plain to the researchers yet they continue on to force-feed inadequate data
into their personal computers, here the problem of lying, whether by exaggera-
tion or concealment, does not stop the researchers, for more than a moment, in
their scientific task. Of course, in fact as a sociologist, such findings are not irrel-
evant: they inform you much about differences in male and female attitudes to
sex—what they don’t tell you is about differences in sexual behaviour. Yet what
Richard Lewontin is telling us is that interview situations are social relation-
ships—that results are a product of a social interaction and will vary with the
gender, class, and age of the interviewer and of the interviewee. But here we have
it: it needs a Professor of Biology to tell sociologists to be sociologists. Thus, he
concludes:
‘The answer, surely, is to be less ambitious and stop trying to make sociology
into a natural science although it is, indeed, the study of natural objects. There
are some things in the world that we will never know and may that we will
never know exactly. Each domain of phenomena has its characteristic grain of
knowability. Biology is not physics, because organisms are such complex
physical objects, and sociology is not biology because human societies are
made by self-conscious organisms. By pretending to a kind of knowledge that
it cannot achieve, social science can only engender the scorn of natural scien-
tists and the cynicism of humanists.’ (ibid.: 29)
Of course this is not the end of it. Edward Laumann and his colleagues are out-
raged. They do not think it ‘appropriate for a biologist ‘ to be reviewing their
work, he does not have the right ‘professional qualifications’—‘his review is a
pastiche of ill-informed personal opinion that makes unfounded claims of rele-
vant scientific authority and expertise’ (1995b: 43).
Lewontin, in reply, notes caustically that it is understandable that the team
‘would have preferred to have their own work reviewed by a member of their
own school of sociology, someone sharing the same unexamined methodolog-
ical assumptions. They could avoid the always unpleasant necessity of justify-
ing the epistemic basis on which the entire structure of their work depends.’
(1995b: 43)
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As to his incompetence with regards to statistical analysis, he points to being a bit
disturbed to have to reveal his CV, but that he has a graduate degree in mathemat-
ical statistics which he has taught for forty years and this is the subject of about
one-tenth of his publications including a textbook of statistics!
And, of course, such a process of believing in the objectivity of data is fostered
by the habit of researchers of not conducting their own interviews, of employing
agencies such as NORC, or second-hand, in terms of using older datasets or even
a meta-analysis of past datasets. So the data arrives at their computers already
punched, sanitised: it is a series of numbers with scientific-looking decimal
points. Human contact is minimised and a barrier of printout and digits occurs
between them and human life.
But let us leave the last remarks of this section to Richard Sennett. He congrat-
ulates Lewontin on the brilliance of his analysis, he laments the current fashion
of scientific sociology, and concurs with Lewontin’s remark that, if work such as
this is typical, then the discipline must be in ‘deep trouble’. That’s putting it
mildly, suggests Sennett, ‘American sociology has become a refuge for the aca-
demically challenged’ (1995: 43). But he adds that mere stupidity itself cannot
alone explain the analytic weakness of such studies for ‘sociology in its
dumbed-down condition is emblematic of a society that doesn’t want to know
much about itself’ (ibid.).
Lessons for Criminology
But what has all of this to do with criminology? A great deal and more, for it is
probably criminology, of all the branches of sociology and psychology, where
the problem of unchecked positivism is greatest. The expansion of academic
criminology was a consequence of the exponential increase in the size of the
criminal justice system just as the shift from students studying social policy/ ad-
ministration to criminology parallels the shift from governmental interventions
through the welfare state to those utilising criminal justice. The war on crime fol-
lowed by the war on drugs and then on terror. This has been accompanied by an
expansion in funding designed to evaluate and assess governmental interven-
tions and programmes. The material basis for the revitalisation of positivist
criminology is considerable and, certainly within the United States, approaching
hegemonic. (see Hayward and Young, 2004)
Embarrassing Findings
Criminological research is replete with findings which range from the very un-
likely to the ridiculous. I will give just a few examples:
Rarity of Serious Crimes
Victimisation studies consistently report levels of serious crime which are gross
underestimations and are freely admitted as such. For example, the first British
Crime Survey of England & Wales in 1982 found only one rape and that at-
tempted.
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Variability of Findings with Different Instruments
If we take sensitive topics such as incidence of domestic violence, the range of
figures are extraordinarily wide—and, in no doubt, underestimates. Thus in
1998 the percentage of women experiencing domestic violence, defined as phys-
ical assault with injury, was 0.5% in the police figures, 1% in the British Crime
Survey, and 2.2% when Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing was used. An in-
dependent survey found a rate in the region of 8%. (Mooney, 1999) Which figure
in this range is one going to feed into one’s PC? What sort of science is it where
estimations of a variable vary sixteen fold?
Self-Report Studies
Self-report studies consistently come up with results showing that there is little
variation between the levels of juvenile delinquency between the working class
and the middle class, between black and white, and produce a considerably re-
duced gap between males and females. Hence Tittle and Villemey’s (1977) ex-
traordinary claim that there is no relationship between class and crime which has
been taken at face value by many theorists. All one can record about this surmise
is John Braithwaite’s pithy remark:
‘it is hardly plausible that one can totally explain away the higher risks of be-
ing mugged and raped in lower class areas as the consequence of the activities
of middle class people who come into the area to perpetrate such acts.’(1981:
37)
The Assault Rate on White Men
The United States NCVS regularly comes up with results which show that the as-
sault rate reported by white men is higher than or just about equal to that of black
men. For example, in 1999 the rate was 32.3 per 1,000 for whites compared to
31.0 per 1,000 for blacks. This is totally against any evidence from homicide
rates or other indices of violence which would suggest a much higher rate for
blacks (see commentary in Sparks, 1981).
Findings of the International Crime and Victimisation Studies
The International Crime and Victimisation Study (van Kesteren et al, 2000) fre-
quently finds rates of reported violence between nations which are almost the in-
verse of the homicide rates. (See Young 2004)
24
The Pluralism of the Dark Figure
Up till now we have discussed either technical problems of non-response or the
more substantive problem of exaggeration or lying. I want now to turn to a third
problem which generates even greater and more impenetrable barriers for scien-
tific quantification. The first two problems—which Lewontin addresses—pre-
sume that there is an objective data to be registered. However, there is a profound
difference between measurement in the natural world and in society, namely that
the definitions of social phenomena are constructed by individuals and in this
they will vary with the social constructs of the actors involved. If one hands out a
dozen metre rules to students and asks them to measure the length of the seminar
room, they will come to a common agreement with a little variation for accuracy.
If one asks the room full to students to measure levels of violence they are, so to
speak, already equipped with a dozen rules of different gauge and length. They
will come out of the exercise with different amounts of violence because their
definitions of violence will vary. And the same will be true of the respondents to a
victimisation study. All of us may agree that a stab wound is violence, but where
along the continuum does violence begin: is it a shove (if so, how hard?), is it a
tap (if so, how weighty?), or perhaps it is a harsh word, an obscenity, a threat?
People vary in their definitions and tolerance of violence: there is a pluralism of
measures.
Let us look at two ‘anomalies’ in this light. The peculiar results of the Interna-
tional Crime Victimisation Studies where the rates of violence reported approxi-
mate the inverse of the rates of violence occurring (if we are to trust the homicide
figures) may well be not merely that reporting to strangers distorts the level of vi-
olence, but that countries with low levels of violence may well have low levels of
tolerance of violence and thus report acts which other, more tolerant/violent na-
tions, might ignore. Similarly the comparatively higher rate of violence against
white compared to black men may reflect differences in definition as to what
constitutes ‘real’violence. Once we have acknowledged the pluralism of human
definition, we can then return to the dark figure with even greater doubts and
trepidations. For the dark figure will expand and contract not merely with the
technical means we bring to it, but with the values of the respondents and indeed
the categories of the interviewers. And the social rather than the merely technical
permeates our measurement on all three levels: whether it is the respondents who
refuse to talk to us, to those that in their relationship with a stranger (of class, gen-
der, age, and perhaps ethnicity) will attempt to convey an impression of them-
selves (a product of their own personal narrative which they have woven around




It is important to stress how damaging such findings are for the positivist, for the
scientific project of studying humanity. For positivism needs fixed categories,
agreed measurements, objective and uncontested figures. The late Hans
Eysenck, the doyen of psychological behaviourism, recognised this quite clearly
in the last book he wrote on criminology with his colleague Gisli Gudjonsson.
For, in The Causes and Cures of Criminality (1989) they began by taking issue
with the authors of The New Criminology (Taylor et al, 1975) in their assertion
that crime is not an objective category but a product of varying legal
fiat—Eysenck and Gudjonnson quite clearly recognise this as an obstacle to sci-
ence and get round the argument by differentiating two types of crime: victim-
less and victimful crime. Victimless crime—and they give examples from prosti-
tution to anal sex—they concede, are subjectively and pluralistically defined.
These are eliminated from the realm of objectivity—but victimful crimes, and
here they list such phenomena as theft, assault, murder, rape, are, they argue, uni-
versally condemned and, therefore, clearly objective. This is obviously untrue:
all of these crimes are subject to varying definitions—to talk of them having a
fixed nature is to teeter on the brink of tautology. Rape is, of course, universally
condemned because it is an illegal sexual attack, but what is rape varies and, in-
deed, expands with time, witness the acknowledgement of marital rape as rape.
And assault, as we have seen, is greatly dependent on our tolerance of violence.
Such a situation of social construction is subject in late modernity to greater
contest and pluralism of definition. So the hidden figure expands and contracts
with the values we bring to it. In a pluralist society it is no longer possible to talk
of a hidden figure x with which we can attempt to measure, but a whole series of
hidden figures x, y, z etc.
The Bogus of Positivism
The positivist dream of a scientific sociology of crime, which attempts to objec-
tively relate cause and effect, becomes all the more impossible in late modernity.
As we have seen, both the causes of crime and the definitions of crime, that is the
outcome or effects, become problematised. To move from, say, unemployment
to crime, or deprivation to crime, you need narratives; correlation alone cannot
assure causality, it is only the narratives which link factors to outcomes that can
do this. People turn ‘factors’ into narratives—they are even capable of turning
such factors on their heads. Furthermore, what is crime itself is part of this narra-
tive. It is a variable dependant on subcultural definition and assessment.
The bogus of positivism was that it only seemed to work when the world was
reasonably static, where vocabularies of motive were seeming organically linked
to points in the social structure and where definitions of crime were consensual
and unproblematised. The loosening of moorings in late modernity, and the mul-
tiple problematisation consequent on pluralism destroys this illusion. As Martin
Nicolaus exclaimed in his famous article in Antioch Review so many years ago,
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‘What kind of science is this, which holds true only when men hold still?’ (1969:
387)
We live in a time of rapid change. In these times, rather than the variables de-
termining the change, it is almost as if the change occurs and the factors seem to
scuttle after them. Prediction of real life events of any consequence has always
been a lamentable failure in the ‘social sciences’, just think of the collapse of
communism and look at the writings of political scientists prior to the days of
glasnost. In criminology we have witnessed in our lifetimes two dramatic
changes completely contrary to our scientific predictions. First of all, in the pe-
riod from the sixties onwards, the crime rate increased remorselessly in the ma-
jority of industrial countries despite the fact that all the factors which had been
identified as reducing crime were on the increase (e.g. wealth, education, em-
ployment, housing). I have termed this elsewhere the ‘aetiological crisis’in crim-
inological theory (1994) and this set in motion an intense debate amongst crimi-
nologists and is the basis for the extraordinary creativity and plethora of theories
that occurred in the last thirty years. But having spent the whole of our profes-
sional lives researching why crime should almost inexorably go up (whether by
relative deprivation, broken homes, social disorganisation, breakdown of con-
trols, labelling, etc.) we find ourselves in the infuriating position of the crime rate
in very many industrial countries (including the US and the UK) beginning to go
down, against all predictions that I know of. Here we have a double trauma or
whammy, if you want!
The Crime Drop in America and the Crisis of Positivism
On November 16 2000, in San Francisco, a packed meeting of the American So-
ciety of Criminology gathered together to discuss a most extraordinary happen-
ing in the world of crime. For from 1991 onwards, violent crime in the United
States, which had led the advanced world by far in rates of murder and robbery,
had begun to fall. Homicide dropped by 35.7 per cent from 1991 to 1998 (from
9.8 to 6.3 per 100,000) (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). Al Blumstein, of the Na-
tional Consortium on Violence Research had brought together a dazzling array
of experts: demographers, economists, sociologists and criminologists, all con-
tributing their views on the change with graphic charts and probing statistical
analysis. I listened with fascination to how they factored each of the develop-
ments over the period to explain the phenomenon, from changes in the distribu-
tion of handguns, the extraordinary prison expansion, zero-tolerance policing,
down to changes in crack-culture and technology. At the end of the session they
asked for comments from the audience, no doubt expecting some detailed re-
mark about policing levels or the influence of handgun availability, or such like;
but the first question, from a Canadian woman, was something of a revelation.
She pointed out, ironically, how Canadians were supposed to be condemned to
culturally lag behind their American cousins, but that they too had had a drop in
violence, despite the fact that they had not experienced such a period of rapid
prison expansion, that zero-tolerance policing was not de rigueur and that Can-
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ada had only a small problem of crack-cocaine. (see commentary in Ouimet,
2002). She was followed by a Spanish woman, who said something very similar
about her country. And, in fact there was a crime drop in 13 out of 21 industrial
countries during 1997–98. (Barclay et al., 2001; Young, 2004)
Blumstein’s team focused on the relationship between variable changes and
the drop of violence. Once international data is examined one must seriously
question whether they were looking at the correct variables. Furthermore, to cap
it all they traced their line of correlation between these variables and the level of
violence when, in fact, property crimes were also declining. The most immediate
explanation of this is that we are encountering ‘spurious causality’. (See Andrew
Sayer, 1992: 193) But the enigma of the crime drop takes us far beyond the world
of technical mistakes. The usual procedure in such analysis is to take the demo-
graphics and other factors which correlate with crime in the past and attempt to
explain the present or predict the future levels of crime in terms of changes in
these variables. The problem here is that people (and young people in particular)
might well change independently of these variables. For in the last analysis the
factors do not add up and the social scientists begin to have to admit the ghost in
the machine. Thus, Richard Rosenfeld of Blumstein’s team writes ruefully:
‘If the church is the last refuge of scoundrels, “culture” is the final recourse of
social scientists in search of explanations when existing economic, social and
political theories have been exhausted.’ (2000: 157)
So there we have it, subculture becomes the final refuge of scoundrels! And
Rosenfeld comments, ‘It is possible that American adults are becoming, in a
word, ‘civilised’ (ibid.: 156).
From a more sympathetic perspective, Andrew Karmen in his meticulous
analysis of the New York crime drop—New York Murder Mystery (2000)—casts
his eyes across all the various explanations judiciously giving them various ex-
planatory weightings, but at the end of the book talks of ‘the final demographic
factor which might be the most important of all’ (2000: 249). But then, he re-
flects, ‘the shift is not even strictly demographic in nature: it is attitudinal and be-
havioral as well as generational’ (ibid.). And, he adds, ‘Unfortunately the exis-
tence of this suspected evolution in subcultural values defies precise statistical
measurement. It is not clear what kind of evidence and statistics could prove or
disprove it.’Karmen points to the possibility of profound changes in the norms of
urban youth culture. And here he refers to the pioneering work of Ric Curtis, the
New York urban anthropologist who talks of the ‘little brother syndrome’. That
is, where younger children, having witnessed the devastating effects of hard
drugs, gun culture, intensive crime on their older brethren decide that these
things are not for them, they are no longer hip and cool—the culture evolves and
turns its face against the past. This observation has ready resonance with, for ex-
ample, any attempt to understand changes in drug use. These do not seem to re-
late to changes in social factors or the impact of the war against drugs. They seem
to relate to changes in fashion—although this is perhaps too light a word for
it—changes in subcultural project would probably be more fitting.
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Curtis relates these changes closely to the development of late modernity, to
the loosening of the moorings that I referred to earlier, or ‘Life in the postmodern
global economy’, he writes, ‘is one in which identity formation is less dependent
upon the influence of family, neighborhoods, race/ethnicity, nationality and his-
tory, and more than anywhere else the inner city is an empty canvass an open
frontier where new structures, institutions and conventions are waiting to be
built.’ (1998: 1276).
An Open Season on Numbers?
Am I suggesting an open season on numbers? Not quite: there are obviously (as
Sennett points out in the Sex in America debate) numbers which are indispens-
able to sociological analysis. Figures of infant mortality, age, marriage, common
economic indicators are cases to point as are, for example, numbers of police,
imprisonment rates and homicide incidences in criminology. Others such as in-
come or ethnicity are of great utility but must be used with caution. There are
things in the social landscape which are distinct, definite and measurable, there
are many others that are blurred because we do not know them—some because
we are unlikely ever to know them, others, more importantly, which are blurred
because it is their nature to be blurred. Precision must be constantly eyed with
suspicion, decimal points with raised eyebrows. There are very many cases
where statistical testing is inappropriate because the data is technically weak—it
will not bear the weight of such analysis, there are many others where the data is
blurred and contested where such testing is simply wrong. There has over the last
decade grown up a peculiar formula for writing journal articles. The introduction
usually presents two theories in competition but they are strange one-dimen-
sional creatures almost unrecognisable compared to the real thing but rendered
simple and decontextualised for the purposes of operationalisation. This acepha-
lous introduction, this headless chicken of an argument is then followed by an
extensive discussion of measures whilst the data itself is usually outsourced from
some past study or bought in from a survey firm, an obligatory regression analy-
sis follows, an erudite statistical equation is a definite plus and then, the usually
inconclusive results are paraded before us. The criminologists themselves are far
distant from crime out there hidden behind a wall of verbiage and computer print
out, the barrier graphited with the greek letters of statistical manipulation.
What can we do to get out of this sanitised redoubt? What is needed is a theo-
retical position which can enter in to the real world of existential joy, fear, false
certainty and doubt, which can seek to understand the subcultural projects of
people in a world riven with inequalities of wealth and uncertainties of identity.
What we need is an ethnographic method which can deal with reflexivity, contra-
diction, tentativeness, change of opinion, posturing and concealment, which is
sensitive to the way people write and rewrite their personal narratives. It will not
be solved by a fake scientificity but by a critical ethnography honed to the poten-
tialities of human creativity and meaning.
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Introduction
Being here in Helsinki, it seems highly appropriate to begin by recalling an arti-
cle from nearly 30 years ago by the grand old lady in criminal law and criminol-
ogy in the Nordic countries, Inkeri Anttila. The title of the article is “Victimolo-
gy—A New Territory in Criminology” (1974).
Although she welcomes the new focus on victims of crime, Anttila offers
what she calls “a word of caution” as regards what is characterised as victim-cen-
tred research. First of all she sees a real danger in “the possibility that interest will
simply shift from the individual offender to the individual victim” as opposed to
a societal perspective, while at the same time underlining the fact that the scope
of individual-centred research is enlarged by 100 percent, or even more, when
also the victim merits attention. A second warning in her article relates to that the
new field places an overemphasis on such types of criminal behaviour where
there is an easily identifiable victim, leading to neglect of other dimensions of
victimisation. She also particularly wants “to point to the dangers of an atomistic
mode of thinking, where sometimes only the offenders, sometimes only the vic-
tims are the main targets of interest” (Anttila 1974: 10).
Where do we stand today three decades later?
Well, for one thing it looks like atomistic thinking has prevailed to the extent that
criminology and victimology frequently appear as totally separate areas of
knowledge, establishing a false categorical distinction between the labels of-
fender and victim. A dichotomy gets rooted, which goes against plenty of empir-
ical documentation as well as everyday experience.
While criminological victimisation research has been referred to as a kind of
“inverted criminology”, simultaneously there has emerged a purer science of the
victim of crime, which deals in depth and extensively with victims’ own experi-
ences of crime and its aftermath.
Accompanying research into the consequences of victimisation, victim sup-
port organisations and victim movements has grown at an amazing speed and
scale. The explicit purpose is to support crime victims and reform the position of
the victim, inside and outside of the criminal justice framework. Applied victim-
ology is the term often used to describe a close co-operation between the aca-
demic field and an activist branch. (Once the abolitionist movement gave impe-
tus to an action-oriented criminological agenda, now a strengthening rather than
weakening of the criminal justice system receives increasing concern.)
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Arguably it is possible to discuss crime victim policy as distinct from crime
policy, though no one can doubt that the most effective way of reducing victimi-
sation is to reduce crime. There is, of course, an inherent connection between
crime prevention and victim prevention.
Victim policy can be loosely conceived as any undertaking—in word or
deed—aimed at supporting victims of crime, be that with regard to the traditional
system of criminal justice or within a broader social welfare perspective.
Today it is said that everybody is “for” and nobody is “against” the crime vic-
tim. But, as we all know, it has taken several decades to try to improve the lot of
crime victims in general and not the least the fate of especially vulnerable groups
of victims. It is hard to believe that any informed person would want a return to
the dismal situation before victims were “discovered” and efforts made to allevi-
ate their position.
However, an intensively expanding victim engagement has also generated
what can be seen as disquieting tendencies that need to be examined. I will only
address a couple of problematic issues.
Victim policy issues/controversies
An all-encompassing victimisation
The greater attention paid to crime victims in recent years indicates an overall
shift of identity or at least a shift of label involving most of us. While once in the
1960s and 70s, it was stressed in criminological research that everyone commits
some type of lawbreaking at one point or other, now victims of crime comprise us
all or at minimum we figure as potential victims. Being victimised tends to re-
place the role of offending.
Crime victims, defined as people who have been exposed to criminal acts, are
in fact being introduced in that role, for example, in television news where the
subtitle presents “Mary—victim of crime” (cf. Tham 2001). Meanwhile the con-
cept of victim has undergone a remarkable expansion. Victimisation seemingly
entails nearly all forms of harms, losses, pain, suffering and discomfort that life
can provide—as any viewer can experience by watching shows that nowadays
are referred to as victim-television.
According to a Danish historian (Henrik Jensen 1998), victim mentality is a
cultural symptom that since the First World War—and the existential loss of in-
nocence—to a higher and higher degree characterises the 20th century develop-
ment. From this point of view, crime victims have joined the ranks of other “de-
fenceless victims of brutal environments”, who seek personal attention and com-
passion in a society where these values appear scarce (ibid.: 15; my translation).
Victim mentality is understandable in a society exceedingly filled with people
who experience external and internal risks of all different kinds. In an ever more
individualised society, people easily feel isolated and become increasingly anx-
ious about their own life situation and personal narrative. Capital of trust has
eroded and in such a climate of individual insecurity, a victim identity can thrive.
The victim image is simultaneously heavily supported by political forces, the se-
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curity industry and in mass media coverage. This all-inclusive, limitless victim
discourse is bound to be problematic.
Victimhood and beyond
The victim labelling carries implications that go beyond the actual experience of
victimisation (as bad as it might be). It brings forth a status as victim, but
victimhood is an ambivalent attribute. On the one hand the recognition as victim
accredits legitimacy and a promise of being on the receiving end of emotional
support and practical assistance. On the other hand, the victim assignment sig-
nals personal powerlessness, and it goes against a concurrent requirement that
every individual should be able to have control over his or her own life and mas-
ter fate.
Despite a certain attractiveness, the recognition as victim at the same time im-
plies a degrading stigma that in the long run hardly leads to a satisfying self-iden-
tity. And an individual who readily sees herself or himself as victim can hardly
avoid being exposed to humiliations or injustices.
Victimhood involves a double-edged status because of the in-built difficulty in
balancing agency with being a passive object of circumstances or actions by others.
The right to be a victim is apparently often closely tied to an obligation to fit into the
image of a deserving victim. In this discourse concerning “worthy victims”, the
question of an individual’s own responsibility stands out as a crucial issue.
In order to counter a strong victim blaming tradition and to generate (valid)
sympathy, especially battered women have frequently been portrayed as without
blame. But the cost associated with not being held responsible also has to be
taken into account. This involves denial of competency, and the abused is then
framed in a psychologically coined expert-version of “learned helplessness” or
receives another syndrome attachment (see e.g. Downs 1996).
Objections have been raised against the prevalent victimhood frame. A fairly
recent Swedish anthology, examining what the social construction of the victim
entails, has in translation got the title The refractory victim (Åkerström & Sahlin
2001). Others as well have pointed out that because of the negative connotations
of pain, weakness, loss of control and subjugation, some victim organisations
and many victims themselves do not wish to have the label applied to them. In-
stead they prefer a term like “survivor”. The notion of “victim empowerment”
also conveys an active approach.
All in all there is growing concern about the overall social impact of victimisa-
tion in “what is said to be a growing and unattractive culture of victimisation in
which more and more people abjure responsibility for their own actions or refuse
to accept that events may be beyond human control” (Rock 2004: 14, cited in
Moody 2003).
Victim policy as a means of creating public consensus
In terms of politics, a reorientation has taken place and crime victims have
gained top priority, though foremost on an ideological level. Their needs and
rights have been acknowledged in international as well as national declarations;
34
many only formulated as promising aspirations, while later ones at least on paper
carry legally binding force.
Nonetheless, according to some critics, crime victims have been politically
manipulated, particularly in North America, in that victim policy demands are
hijacked and redefined to suit law-and-order campaigns for repressive politics
(see e.g. Elias 1993). Illustrations of zero-sum thinking allegedly in the interests
of victims can also be found elsewhere, supporting the saying: “It is not evil for
one but that is good for another”.
Yet the most striking feature is probably the political consensus surrounding
victim concerns. In this light the victimisation discourse, with the victims’move-
ment as prime mover, has been analysed as a possible new foundation for a
Durkheimian collective consciousness in society (Boutellier 2000). Solidarity
with crime victims creates a basis for a common morality and re-establishes a
threatened consensus in our secularised times, where relativistic norms and val-
ues prevail.
On a more pragmatic level, it has been pointed out that member states in or-
ganisations like the Council of Europe and the EU with remarkable ease agree
upon victim reforms—in part because they believe that their own country al-
ready submits to the standards in question. However, an evaluation of the Coun-
cil of Europe 1985 recommendation The Position of the Victim in the Framework
of Criminal Law and Procedure clearly demonstrated lack of implementation
(Brienen & Hoegen 2000).
The more recent and binding document by the Council of Ministers of the Eu-
ropean Union, the 2001 Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Crim-
inal Proceedings was too easily adopted according to one well informed com-
mentator. Although he views the adoption of declarations concerning victims’
needs as important in order for reformers to be able to confront governments, he
asks that more attention be paid to hidden agendas and political expediency as
the real motivation behind victim policy agreements (Groenhuijsen 2003). Nota-
bly, it is rather ironic that while EU states are mostly uncritical of their own treat-
ment of crime victims, they are very critical towards accession states (ibid.).
Moreover, a Swedish commentator (Tham 2001) has proclaimed royal en-
gagement in crime victims as perhaps the most decisive sign of the consensus
sharing and uncontroversial nature of this concern. The Swedish queen is princi-
pal protector of the national victim support organisation and Her Royal Highness
Princess Anne is more than a head figure for Victim Support in the UK. She also
opened the latest world symposium in victimology (South Africa in 2003) and
gave a plenary presentation on assistance to victims of crime.
What are the appropriate roles of victims in the criminal justice
process?
Without doubt, victims of crime have for a long time been ignored in the admin-
istration of justice. They have been depicted as the forgotten party; neglected, de-
serted, deceived, frustrated and even abused by the system. Slowly over a few de-
cades grievances have been heard and, to some degree, needs have been re-
sponded to.
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Concerning some reform areas there is no opposition: Victims should be
treated with respect, compassion and dignity; compensation should be available
as well as, for example, separate waiting facilities in courtrooms. In addition, re-
search has repeatedly documented that victims want information about their
case, about the criminal justice system and about support.
However, other dimensions related to integrating the victim of crime to the
process stand out as highly controversial. Policies aimed at enhancing victim
participation in the criminal justice system emerged throughout the 1980s. Many
countries belonging to the Anglo-American legal family have adopted victim
impact statements. This measure allows victims to submit a written or oral state-
ment on the impact of the crime victimisation at sentencing, but has been met
with strong resistance by a number of legal scholars (see e.g. Ashworth 2000).
The primary objections include the possible threat to the rights of the accused,
victim revenge and sentencing severity.
How far it is possible in the US to involve crime victims or their close relatives
further in the execution of sentences can be illustrated by legislation that secures
the family of a murdered victim the right to attend the execution of the offender.
Likewise the victim or family members have a right to say whether a pris-
oner—after many years of imprisonment—shall be eligible for parole. It is diffi-
cult for me not to see this type of victim participation as a prolongation or even
cementing of victimhood.
“Relative moderation” is said to represent the main tendency in European re-
forms for crime victims. And in the continental context, the inclusion of victim
input at sentencing has not received major backing. Still there is, for example in
the Nordic countries, a growing recognition of an inadequate standing for vic-
tims in criminal proceedings. With the adoption of the earlier mentioned EU
framework decision we will in all likelihood see some changes in the coming
years.
Is restorative justice a better deal for victims?
There is a considerable debate among both academics and professionals about
whether restorative justice offers victims a better deal than the ordinary criminal
justice system. This issue received considerable attention at the XI International
Symposium on Victimology, which took place in the summer of 2003.
Restorative justice is a very broad term with no precise definition and under
which a number of different initiatives fall. One popular definition says that re-
storative justice is: “a process whereby all parties with a stake in a specific of-
fence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the
offence and its implications for the future” (Marshall 1999). Nevertheless, vic-
tims are not always included in the restorative justice process, and some victim
advocates maintain that victim involvement frequently is set aside in favour of
the other stakeholders, that is, the offender, the community and the government.
With respect to victim-offender mediation, however, victims do participate ei-
ther directly through face-to-face contact or indirectly, when the mediator shut-
tles between the two parties.
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Despite victim involvement in mediation and a documented interest among
victims to take part in this process, the crucial question is whether or not they ac-
tually want decision-making power. Do they want the power to decide or does
such a right to be heard place an unwanted burden on them?
The victimological literature is quite clear regarding victim input into proce-
dures: victims seek information, consultation and consideration. However, it is
less clear just to what extent victims want to participate in the decision-making
process. A recent Canadian study indicates that victims place great emphasis on
having a voice in the process and having their voice heard, but “while they seek
input, they are content to leave decision control in the hands of the authorities”
(Wemmers & Cyr 2003). The findings are interpreted as follows:
“Given that victims do not seek decision-making power, but simply want to be
taken into consideration, victim participation in the criminal justice process
should not pose a threat to the existing power balance, nor to the rights of the ac-
cused within the conventional criminal justice system” (ibid.).
The optimistic view is therefore that the unsatisfactory limited role that is given
to the victim as merely a witness in the proceedings can be upgraded without sac-
rificing the basic rights of the offender. Both victims and offenders can be shown
respect and recognised as subjects rather than being objectified by the law.
Interestingly enough in terms of reconciling traditionally incompatible pun-
ishment perspectives, Howard Zehr, possibly the most well known proponent of
restorative justice, deals with this paradigmatic rivalry in a book review. In one of
the chapters by a legal philosopher, it is argued that “the theory of retribution and
the theory of restoration are not the opposites they are often represented to be; in-
deed, they have a great deal in common. Both reflect a central, perhaps universal,
moral intuition that something is owed to victims and society by offenders and
that there ought to be a reciprocity between offence and response; where they dif-
fer is on the currency of what will make this right” (Zehr 2003: 653).
It is further claimed that “restorative justice advocates have done a disservice
by positioning restoration and retribution as mutually exclusive adversaries”,
and Zehr concludes: “As a restorative justice advocate who initially popularised
this dichotomy, … I have personally taken this argument to heart and changed
my approach accordingly” (ibid.: 654).
Let me conclude by arguing that from a victim perspective, reliance on the
conventional criminal justice system certainly makes it difficult to erase the nar-
row dualistic option between either being placed in the role of a blameless victim
marked by passivity or being treated as an active subject and therefore somehow
a part to what has taken place.
A restorative justice approach—though not necessarily as a mutually exclu-
sive alternative—has the potential of offering a wider range of options for all
crime victims. That is, victims by no means represent a homogenous entity and
everyone does not fall into the category of the “ideal victim”. Victim has to be
treated as “a term that is about interpretation by self and others rather than an ob-
jectively identifiable category” (Moody 2003). Victim policy accordingly needs
to take that diversity into serious consideration.
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Introduction
In this presentation I will examine the evolution of crime rates according to po-
lice statistics from 1990 to 2000 in twenty-nine European countries2. The of-
fences considered are intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, vehicle
theft, burglary, domestic burglary, and drug offences. Data are taken from the
first and the second edition of the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal
Justice Statistics (Council of Europe, 1999; Killias et al., 2003).
Methodology
It is a well-known fact that reporting and recording practices affect the validity
and reliability of police statistics as measures of the social reaction to crime, and
that these practices vary across offences, countries, and time. For example, ac-
cording to the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) conducted in 2000, in
the so-called industrialized countries, only 40% of the attempted burglaries were
reported to the police, but the percentage rises to 78% when completed burglar-
ies are considered. Nevertheless, the latter percentage varies from 92% in Bel-
gium to 59% in Portugal. Moreover, in Poland the percentage rose from 49% in
1992 to 54% in 1996, and to 62% in 2000 (van Kesteren, Mayhew &
Nieuwbeerta, 2001: 194–5). It is for these reasons that, for some offences, the
correlations between victimization rates and police recorded crime can be im-
proved if data are weighted according to the percentage of offences reported to
the police (Aebi, Killias & Tavares, 2002).
As far as recording practices are concerned, crime rates vary according to the
moment when data are collected for police statistics, the counting unit used in the
statistics, and the way in which multiple offences and offences committed by
more than one person are counted (European Sourcebook 2003: 74–5). Thus, it
has been shown that the high rates of rape in Swedish police statistics are due to a
combination of all these factors (von Hofer, 2000) and that the group of Euro-
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1 This paper was written during a stay at the Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht
(Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany) made possible through the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
2 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England & Wales, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Rus-
sia, Scotland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.
pean countries that records data for statistical purposes when the offence is re-
ported to the police systematically presents higher crime rates than the group of
countries that records data when the police have completed the investigation
(Aebi, submitted). In fact, statistical counting rules seem to be the main explana-
tion of cross-national differences in recorded crime.
As a consequence, the validity of cross-national comparisons of crime rates
according to police statistics is extremely doubtful. On the contrary, police statis-
tics provide a reasonably valid basis to study time series, as long as the statistical
counting rules and the legal definitions used have not experienced substantial
changes during the period studied or have changed in ways it is possible to run
controls for (von Hofer, 2000). That is why in this presentation I will not talk
about crime levels but about crime trends.
Besides, in order to reduce the impact of sudden changes in the data recording
methods of a particular country, I will not analyze trends in each country but in
two groups of them. The first group includes sixteen Western European countries
and the second one thirteen Central and Eastern European countries (see Annex).
Furthermore, I will use the rates of offences known to the police per 100,000
population in each country to compute median rates instead of mean rates for
both groups of countries because, from a statistical point of view, the mean is ex-
tremely sensitive to extreme values (outliers), while the median is not. In addi-
tion, as small numbers contribute to the lack of statistical reliability, my analysis
does not include countries with less than one million inhabitants. As a matter of
fact, such countries may experience substantial changes in crime rates from one
year to another that are only due to the addition or the subtraction of a few of-
fences.
All in all, the analyses cover twenty-nine countries and ten offences over
eleven years, but, as some countries did not provide data for every offence and
every year, they include less than the 3,190 theoretically possible figures. In that
context, when only one year was missing in the time series of a country for a spe-
cific offence, I interpolated it using the figures given by the country for the previ-
ous and the subsequent year. If the missing value was the figure for 1990—i.e.
the first year of the time series—I used the figure for 1991; if it was the figure for
2000—i.e. the last year of the time series—I used the figure for 1999. When data
for more than one year was missing, the country was excluded from the analysis.
Whenever there were differences in the figures provided for 1995 and/or 1996
between the first and the second edition of the European Sourcebook, I used the
figures of the second edition, which is an update of the first one (European
Sourcebook 2003: 5). Finally, my calculations of median rates and percentage
changes between 1990 and 2000 are based upon unrounded scores (i.e. they in-
clude all decimals that could not be shown in the printed versions of both editions
of the European Sourcebook). The list of countries included in each analysis can




Property offences: Theft, vehicle theft, burglary, and
domestic burglary
Property offences are presented in Figures 1 to 4. They include an overall mea-
sure of theft (Figure 1) and a number of subcategories such as vehicle theft (Fig-
ure 2), burglary (Figure 3), and its subcategory domestic burglary (Figure 4). Ac-
cording to the classification of offences of the European Sourcebook, theft does
not include robbery. Thus, in countries where the concept of robbery is expressed
as theft with violence against persons (e.g. Spain), robberies were subtracted
from the total number of thefts by the national correspondents that provided the
data for the European Sourcebook.
In Western Europe, theft increased from 1990 to 1993 and started decreasing
afterwards. Thus, the median theft rate for 2000 was 16% lower than the one for
1990. Domestic burglary followed the same pattern, registering an increase be-
tween 1990 and 1993 and a decrease subsequently. Overall, a comparison of the
rate for 2000 with the rate for 1990 shows a 10% decrease in domestic burglary.
In the case of burglary, there was an increase between 1990 and 1991 followed by
a decrease in 1992 and 1993, a rather stable trend from then up to 1999—with
rates comparable to the rate for 1990—and a substantial decrease in 2000.
Hence, the median burglary rate for 2000 was 12% lower than the one for 1990.
Vehicle theft followed an analogous trend until 1997, that is an increase from
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Figure 1. Median rates of theft per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 19 European
countries according to police statistics
and comparable to the rate for 1990; but in 1998 the rates rose again and they re-
mained at that level until 2000. All in all, the median rate for vehicle theft in 2000
was 15% higher than the median rate for 1990.
In a few words, in Western European countries property offences increased at
the beginning of the 1990s, registering peaks from 1991 to 1993, and then de-
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Figure 2. Median rates of vehicle theft per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 23 European
countries according to police statistics
Burglary
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Figure 3. Median rates of burglary per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 17 European
countries according to police statistics
The only exception is motor vehicle theft, which followed the same pattern until
1997, but registered an increase in the last three years of the time series.
In Central and Eastern Europe, domestic burglary increased by successive
stages during the whole period studied. Thus the median rate for 2000 was 72%
higher than the rate for 1990. Motor vehicle theft increased almost constantly
leading to a median rate 236% higher in 2000 than in 1990. Theft and burglary
followed a curvilinear trend characterized by a sharp increase at the beginning of
the decade, followed by a decrease until 1994, a new increase until 1997 and
1998 and a decrease during the last years covered. On the whole, theft increased
by 47% during the period studied, while the median rate for burglary was the
same in 1990 than in 2000.
In sum, in Central and Eastern Europe, rates of property offences were pretty
low in 1990 and followed an upward trend throughout the decade. With the ex-
ception of burglary—an offence for which the sample is probably not representa-
tive of the region studied because only five countries provided data—all property
offences presented higher rates in 2000 than in 1990.
Violent offences: Homicide, assault, rape, and robbery
Violent offences are presented in Figures 5 to 9. They include homicide (Figures
5 and 6), assault (Figure 7), rape (Figure 8) and robbery (Figure 9).
In Western Europe, assault and rape increased in an almost linear way during
the 1990s. In fact, when the first edition of the European Sourcebook (Council of
Europe, 1999) was published, an analysis of the available trends for both of-
fences led Killias & Aebi (2000a) to warn that “the increase might not have
reached its upper level by the end of the time series” (Killias & Aebi, 2000a: 52)
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Figure 4. Median rates of domestic burglary per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 16
European countries according to police statistics
1997. On the whole, the 2000 assault rate is 85% above that of 1990, and the 2000
rape rate is 36% above that of 1990. Robbery increased substantially at the be-
ginning of the time series (1990–1993), then decreased provisionally in the mid-
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Figure 5. Median rates of intentional homicide including attempts per 100,000 population from
1990 to 2000 in 23 European countries according to police statistics








Figure 6. Median rates of completed intentional homicide per 100,000 population from 1990 to
2000 in 14 Western European countries according to police statistics
for 2000 that was 22% higher than the one for 1990. Only homicide remained
stable during the whole period.
In Central and Eastern Europe, rape reached a peak in 1993 and decreased af-
ter that. Nevertheless, by the end of the series, the rate was still 8% higher than in
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Figure 7. Median rates of assault per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 23 European
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Figure 8. Median rates of rape per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 25 European
countries according to police statistics
crease, but once more the median rate for 2000 was higher—in this case by
16%—than the rate for 1990. Robbery followed a curvilinear upward trend in
such a way that, by 2000, the median rate was 100% higher than in 1990. Finally,
homicide increased sharply at the beginning of the time series, reaching peaks in
1993 and 1994 and decreasing constantly after that, although in 2000 the median
rate was still 30% higher than in 1990. Incidentally, homicide was the only of-
fence that showed higher median rates in Central and Eastern Europe than in
Western Europe.
In sum, according to police statistics, European societies would have been
more violent by the end of the millennium than ten years before. Nevertheless,
both sides of the continent followed a different trend throughout the 1990s. In
Central and Eastern Europe the peaks were reached sometime during the begin-
ning or the middle of the decade (i.e. between 1992 and 1997) and, with the only
exception of robbery that continued to increase, the trend was a decreasing one
by the end of it. In Western Europe, on the contrary, violent offences followed an
upward trend, with homicide as a noteworthy exception.
Drug offences
As can be seen in Figure 10, both in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe,
there has been a steady increase of drug offences during the whole period stud-
ied. In fact, every European country experienced an increase in police recorded
drug offences between 1990 and 2000. Thus, in 2000, the median rate of drug of-
fences was sixteen times higher than in 1990 in Central and Eastern European
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Figure 9. Median rates of robbery per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 24 European
countries according to police statistics
Discussion
In order to understand the crime trends that I have just exposed, one must take
into consideration the political, economic and social situation of Europe during
the period covered by the analyses. In November 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall
produced a substantial modification of crime opportunities by putting in contact
two parts of the continent that differed dramatically in wealth; thus, within a few
months, a substantial market for stolen products, including stolen cars, jewelry,
electronic devices and even clothes emerged in Central and Eastern Europe
(Killias & Aebi, 2000a). This led to a more organized kind of crime with the de-
velopment of gangs that took advantage of the new lines for the transportation of
drugs, illegal goods and commodities, and even human beings, between both
sides of the continent.
In that context, the increase in all kinds of property offences registered on the
wealthy side of Europe at the beginning of the 1990s seems quite logical, and ad-
justs itself to the predictions of an opportunity-based theory such as the routine
activities approach (Cohen & Felson, 1979, Felson 2001). The decrease that fol-
lowed could be explained by the combination of at least three factors. Firstly, a
saturation of the Eastern market; secondly, a reinforcement of police measures
against transborder crime, especially in countries seeking to become members of
the European Union; and, thirdly, as suggested by Lamon (2002) on the basis of
ICVS data, an improvement in security measures in Western European house-
holds.
Robbery is an interesting case because it is a combination of a property of-
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Figure 10. Median rates of drug offences per 100,000 population from 1990 to 2000 in 20
European countries according to police statistics
reasons that I have just explained—it increased in Western Europe at the begin-
ning of the 1990s and started decreasing shortly afterwards; but this was fol-
lowed by a new upward trend since the middle of the nineties. The latter may be
somehow related to the increase in drug use in Europe (see below) and its conse-
quences on the number of muggings committed3, but its main cause seems to be
the increase in small electronic devices—and, in particular, mobile
phones—ownership and theft. Thus, research conducted in England and Wales
on the basis of the 2000 British Crime Survey, school surveys and recorded po-
lice robbery figures, shows that mobile phone theft increased by 190% between
1995 and 2000—while the number of phone subscribers increased by
600%—and represented 28% of all robberies in 2000/2001 compared to 8% in
1998/1999 (Harrington, & Mayhew, 2002). This evolution reminds one of the
explanation given by the routine activities approach (Cohen & Felson, 1979,
Felson 2001: 32) suggesting that one of the main causes of the mushrooming
crime rates in the United States after 1963 was the proliferation of lightweight
goods that were easy to steal. In the same line of reasoning, mobile phones be-
long undoubtedly to the category of hot products, defined by Clarke (1999) as
products that are stolen much more than others because they are concealable, re-
movable, available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable. Moreover, we seem to
be far away from a saturation of the black market for these products as new mod-
els—including new functions and gadgets such as built-in digital cameras—are
being released constantly4.
Finally, the increase in vehicle theft in Western Europe at the end of the time
series is due to increases in eight out of fourteen countries, while England and
Wales, France, Germany, Italy, Scotland and Switzerland showed a downward
trend during that period. These trends are not easy to explain with the available
information because of some methodological problems. First of all, the number
of vehicle thefts per 100,000 population is not a good measure for such a crime.
A better indicator would be the number of vehicle thefts per 100,000 cars avail-
able in each country. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on that issue as fig-
ures from the ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers Association) do not
include motorcycles, which represent a substantial part of vehicle theft—e.g.
25% in France—in some countries (EUCPN, 2003). Second, in countries such as
France, Italy or Spain that receive tens of millions of tourists each year, the theft
of cars and motorcycles rented by them can be quite important (Aebi & Mapelli,
2003) and adds more distortions to the crime rate per 100,000 population. Third,
vehicle theft includes theft for profit and theft for joyriding, but the proportion of
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3 For example, in Switzerland, the relatively high rates of robbery at the beginning of the 1990s were partly due to
muggings committed by drug addicts near open drug-using sites, and the decrease of such offence in the mid-1990s
seems largely due to the success of the Swiss heroin prescription programs (Killias & Aebi, 2000b). Incidentally, Swit-
zerland is one of the just three countries—the other two are Finland and Scotland—that registered slightly lower rates
of robbery in 2000 than in 1990.
4 The idea that hot products go through a life cycle of vulnerability was first put forward by Gould (1969) and developed
lately by Mansfield, Gould & Namenwirth (1974), Felson (1997), and Guerette & Clarke (2003). According to the lat-
ter: “At first, these products attract little theft because they are unfamiliar and relatively unavailable. As their popular-
ity among consumers grows, thieves become attracted to them for personal use or for resale. Subsequently, they
become widely available and relatively inexpensive, and their attractiveness for theft declines” (Guerette & Clarke,
2003: 7).
each of these categories varies across countries and over time. For example, tak-
ing into account the number and the type of cars stolen and recovered—and as-
suming that the cars recovered are mainly those that were used for joyrid-
ing—from the 1970s to 2000 in Italy, Barbagli, Colombo & Savona (2003: 148,
with references) found that by the end of the century joyriding had decreased
while theft of cars had increased, and that the number of cars recovered was quite
different according to their cubic capacity. The latter finding suggests that there
is a careful selection of the type of cars stolen that could be explained by the exis-
tence of a (mainly Eastern European) black market for some specific models.
In Central and Eastern Europe, crime trends followed a different pattern. In
fact, with the exception of homicide, most offences presented pretty low rates in
1990. Such rates were probably a reflection of the life style under the authoritar-
ian regimes that were falling apart at that moment5. However, the reliability of
police statistics during such a period of transition is doubtful. Furthermore, such
statistics were still under the influence of the recording practices applied during
the communist regimes, which were most likely oriented to show low crime
rates.
In that context, the fall of the communist regimes was followed by an explo-
sion of violence in Central and Eastern Europe that was particularly palpable in
the sharp increase of homicide at the beginning of the 1990s. Shelley (2002) has
suggested that in Russia the increase in violence was due to the transition and the
rise of organized crime, and the same explanation seems to hold true for the rest
of Central and Eastern Europe, with the already mentioned exception of Turkey
(see note 4). Then, as countries started to reorganize themselves, violence be-
came less common. At the same time, the development of a market economy
multiplied the number of consumer goods—suitable targets for theft—and was
accompanied by a social fracture between those with power or influence and the
rest of the population—that started suffering of mass unemployment—creating
thus the setting for an increase in property offences.
This process went together with an increase in the number of drug users. In
fact, according to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic-
tion (EMCDDA), drug use increased during the 1990s both in acceding and can-
didate countries to the European Union (EMCDDA, 2003a) and in the European
Union and Norway (EMCDDA, 2003b). The ESPAD school survey project also
showed that the lifetime prevalence of use of illicit drugs among 15–16-year-old
students increased in Europe between 1995 and 1999 (Hibell, Anderson &
Bjarnason, 1997; Hibell, Anderson & Ahlstrom, 2000) Thus, the upward trend in
police recorded drug offences mirrors a real increase in drug use in the whole Eu-
rope. The latter could be related to an increased availability of drugs in the mar-
kets provoked by the opening ot the European borders that facilitated the distri-
bution of drugs produced principally in the Middle East (Killias & Aebi, 2000a)
At the same time, the struggles between different groups and organizations
that tried to take control over these new lines of transportation of drugs, goods
and commodities, and human beings—mainly illegal aliens and prostitutes—as
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5 Turkey—included only in the analyses of robbery and vehicle theft trends—is of course an exception to that situation.
well as over the markets associated to them, may explain a part of the increase in
violent offences in Western Europe. That would also explain partially the in-
crease in the number of foreing prisoners in Western European prisons6. In fact,
that increase has often been evoked by the mass media as well as by right wing
parties to support the idea that there is a link between immigration and the rise of
violence in Western Europe. However, this idea is extremely simplistic for a vari-
ety of reasons.
In the first place, foreigners sent to prison for their participation in criminal
gangs or networks acting across national borders cannot be compared to immi-
grants or guest workers. In the second place, a considerable number of foreigners
are in prison for infractions to immigration laws (Tournier, 1997; Melossi, 2003;
Wacquant, 1999), that is to say that they are in prison for being foreigners and not
for being suspects or authors of a criminal offence. In the third place, one must
take into consideration that the deterioration of most Western European econo-
mies since the mid-1970s and the rise of unemployment led to a progressive
hardening of immigration laws in such a way that, nowadays, it is very difficult to
enter Europe as a legal immigrant. The consequence was an increase in the num-
ber of illegal aliens (sans-papiers) and asylum seekers, which are in fact the cate-
gories that are usually over-represented among offenders (Barbagli, 1998).
Killias (2001: 168) suggests that this representation may be linked to the fact
that—in contrast with legal immigrants—illegal aliens and asylum seekers can-
not make long-term plans because they already know that sooner or later they
will be expelled, and therefore some of them may engage in criminal activities
that provide quick profit.
Nevertheless, in the context of the specific category of legal immigrants, a re-
view of recent European studies (Killias, 2001: 173–9) shows that second gener-
ation immigrants present higher levels of involvement in delinquency than their
native counterparts. Such finding raises a question: Is this a matter of different
cultures or of different socioeconomic status? In fact, this is more or less the
same question that was answered by Shaw & McKay (1942) with their studies of
the city of Chicago, and we can apply a logic similar to the one used by them to
try and give an answer to it.
To begin with, we know that, when they are living in their own countries,
Western Europeans present lower rates of delinquency than immigrants coming
from other cultures. But what happens when they migrate to other cultures? If
their low rates of delinquency were explained by their culture, then they should
not present higher rates of delinquency than the autochthones. On the contrary, if
their low rates of delinquency were related to their socioeconomic status and
they migrate to another culture where they have a lower socioeconomic status
than the autochthones, then they should present higher rates of delinquency than
them. The problem is that few Western Europeans are migrating nowadays to
other parts of the globe and, whenever they migrate, they usually do so because
they are sent abroad by their employers and therefore they do not have a lower so-
cioeconomic status than the autochthones.
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6 The percentage of foreigners in European prisons can be found in the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics
(Council of Europe, 2003).
However, the situation was completely different one hundred years ago, when
Europe was a land of emigration. Therefore, I decided to look for research con-
cerning that period, and particularly for research on emigration to South Amer-
ica, which is usually considered as a subcontinent with a very different culture7.
Quite a few studies are available—often ignored by European researchers that
tend to focus their attention on studies on emigration to the United States—and
they arrive to similar conclusions that are best illustrated by the arrest rates calcu-
lated by Blackwelder & Johnson (1982: 368) and represented here in a graphic
way in Figure 11.
Figure 11 shows the implication in delinquency of ethnic minorities in Bue-
nos Aires in 1910. Interestingly enough, the ethnic minorities of that period were
mainly Western European citizens: French, British, Italians and Spaniards. Even
more interesting is discovering that they were more implicated in delinquency
than native born Argentineans. For example, 99 out of each 1,000 British citizens
were arrested in Buenos Aires in 1910 for public disturbances, and the arrest
rates were 77 out of 1,000 for French citizens, 50 out of 1,000 for Spaniards, 31
out of 1,000 for Italians, but only 29 out of 1,000 for native-born Argentineans.
Thus, one has to admit that the overrepresentation of ethnic minorities among of-
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Figure 11. Arrest rates per 1,000 males aged 16–50 by nationality in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
in 1910. Source: Blackwelder & Johnson (1982: 368)
7 For details of my research on that topic, see Aebi (in press).
quences on health, education, neighborhood of residence, group of peers, work
opportunities, and other aspects of life—than with their culture.
Therefore, I think that the current European debate on ethnic minorities
should focus on improving their quality of life and avoiding the consolidation of
ethnic neighborhoods instead of on discussing their cultural differences. The
road is long because the mere fact of talking about second and third generation
immigrants instead of nationals reflects the failure of Western European societ-
ies to integrate them. The reason for that failure is quite simple: instead of devel-
oping immigration policies, Western Europe has always developed labor market
policies for immigrants. Such a situation led to a paradox such as applying social
control theory (Hirschi, 1969) to explain delinquency of nationals and immi-
grants when such a theory is based on the importance of the attachment to par-
ents—considered as one of the main elements of the bond to society—while we
live in countries where even legal immigrants cannot always bring their families
with them. In fact, European immigration laws help weakening the bond be-
tween immigrant parents and their children by creating artificially broken
homes.
After all this has been said, I would like to point out that there are also some ar-
tificial reasons for the increase in recorded violent offences in Western Europe
during the 1990s. In the first place, the increase is partially due to changes in data
recording methods—which are sometimes referred to as better recording prac-
tices although it is questionable if these practices are better or simply different.
Regarding assault, this was the case for countries such as Northern Ireland—
where the number of assaults was multiplied by four between 1997 and 1998—
and England and Wales—where assault increased by 63% from 1997 to 1998—
and Ireland—where assault increased sharply in 2000, although the figure is not
comparable to the one for 1999 because the latter covers only nine months (Euro-
pean Sourcebook 2003: 47). As concerns rape, Finland, Germany, Italy and
Spain enlarged their definitions during the 1990s (European Sourcebook 2003:
47), but the changes did not introduce clear breaks in the time series such as the
ones pointed out for assault.
In the second place, the increase in violent offences in Western Europe seems
partially due to an increase in the reporting of offences to the police. In that con-
text, recent research on the Netherlands (Wittebrood & Junger, 2002), England,
and the Scandinavian countries (von Hofer, unpublished) has shown that, during
the last quarter of the 20th century, victimization surveys indicated a slight in-
crease of violent offences, while according to police statistics there was a huge
increase of that kind of offences. In Spain, the increase in assault is mainly due to
an increase of more than 100% in the reporting of domestic violence. Indeed, in
1997 there were 3,492 domestic violence offences known to the Spanish police
forces, while in 2000 there were 7,122. Thus, in 1997, domestic violence of-
fences represented 27% of the total number of assault offences, while in 2000
they represented 41%. Although in Spain there are no regular victimization sur-
veys that would give an alternative measure of that offence, it seems difficult to
imagine an actual increase of more than 100% in domestic violence taking place
in only three years.
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However, it must be kept in mind that, in 2000, every Western European coun-
try included in the analysis presented higher rates of assault than in 1990, and
that only three countries (Denmark, Spain and Switzerland) presented lower
rates of rape than in 1990.
Indeed, homicide is the only violent offence whose rates remained stable
throughout the 1990s. Such stability may be due to two major factors: the rela-
tively low and stable rates of arm possession in Western European households
(Killias, van Kesteren & Rindlisbacher, 2001) and the quality of the health ser-
vices. Harris et al. (2002) have studied the importance of the latter in the United
States. They point out that, despite the proliferation of increasingly dangerous
weapons and the very large increase in rates of serious criminal assault since
1960, the lethality of such assaults dropped dramatically between 1960 and
1999. According to Harris et al. (2002), this paradox is explained by the develop-
ments in medical technology and related medical support services. Without such
progress, instead of having a downward trend, the United States would probably
have had an upward one. In my opinion, the same explanation holds true for
Western Europe in the 1990s.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that, while the analysis of Gottfredson (un-
published) suggests that the general evolution of delinquency in the United
States is correlated with the evolution of homicide rates, my analyses show that
there is no such correlation in Europe. The availability of guns is probably one of
the major causes of such a difference that, in any case, confirms the particulari-
ties of the European context.
Conclusion
According to police statistics, between 1990 and 2000, in Central and Eastern
Europe there was an increase in drug and property offences, while violent of-
fences reached a peak during the 1990s but were decreasing by the end of the de-
cade. During the same period, in Western Europe there was an increase in drug
and violent offences, while property offences reached a peak at the beginning of
the 1990s and started decreasing afterwards.
These trends were heavily influenced by the political, economical and social
changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe since the break-up of the
Soviet Union in 1989. The political turmoil that followed helped the develop-
ment of organized crime and led to an increase in violent offences—especially
homicide—in that region of Europe. The trend was reversed when the political
situation started to stabilize. At the same time, unemployment rose, the socio-
economic status of a good part of the population declined and, even if the devel-
opment of a market economy increased the availability of goods and improved
macroeconomic indicators, it is not clear whether this improvement was also ex-
perienced at the microlevel. As a consequence property offences followed an up-
ward trend in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s.
Moreover, the emergence of a large black market for stolen goods in Central
and Eastern Europe seems to be the cause of the increase in property offences in
Western Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. The subsequent decrease of such
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offences is probably related to a relative saturation of Central and Eastern Euro-
pean markets, a reinforcement of police measures in the frontiers, and an im-
provement of security measures in Western European households. By the end of
the time series, a majority of Western European countries experienced an in-
crease in vehicle theft that could be related to the existence of a market for some
specific cars, although more research is needed on that topic. Finally, robbery
matched the evolution of property offences until 1995—that is an increase fol-
lowed by a decrease—but started to increase again from 1996 to 2000. This up-
ward trend in the second half of the decade seems mainly related to the increase
in the theft of mobile phones and other small electronic devices.
Regarding the increase in drug offences in both sides of Europe, research on
drug use shows that there has been an increase in the number of drug users in the
whole continent since 1990, a finding that suggests that the increase in offences
is not a mere artifact produced by police statistics. This upward trend could be re-
lated to the increased availability of drugs in European markets. In fact, the open-
ing of the European borders helped the development of new lines of transport for
drugs and all kinds of goods and commodities—legal, illegal or stolen—as well
as for the traffic of human beings—mainly illegal immigrants and prostitutes.
Furthermore, the fights over such lines of distribution and potential markets may
explain partially the increase in violent offences in Western Europe. Other
causes of that increase are the development and consolidation of problematic
neighborhoods in some European cities, as well as an increase in the reporting of
violent offences to the police and modifications of data recording methods (i.e.
changes in the way data are recorded for police statistics).
In sum, crime trends in Europe are perfectly explained by an opportu-
nity-based theory such as the routine activities approach (Cohen & Felson, 1979,
Felson 2001). This, of course, does not prove that the theory is universal, but sug-
gests that it works well in market economy societies. Nevertheless, its applica-
tion to Europe also shows that crime opportunities are heavily influenced by
socio-economical factors. In fact, crime opportunities in Europe throughout the
1990s seemed to be shaped by the socio-economic situation of the different
countries of the region.
Therefore, I believe that situational crime prevention measures will help re-
duce crime—and should therefore be encouraged because by reducing crime
they will improve the quality of life of the citizens—but they will not be enough
if they are not accompanied by a reduction of social and economical disparities
between countries. The enlargement of the European Union constitutes a first
step in that sense, but the rest of the world should not be forgotten.
A final remark
I would like to end this presentation with a sort of annex summarizing the very
interesting discussions in which I took part during this third conference of the
European Society of Criminology. In fact, one of the things that I appreciated the
most while reading the program of this conference was that the organizers had in-
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vited representatives of that wide movement that, for the sake of convenience, I
will label here as critical criminology, even if such a label includes a series of dif-
ferent views on crime that sometimes are not strictly compatible. I was never re-
ally convinced by the methodology applied by critical criminologists in their es-
says but, as I believe that Karl Popper (1959/1934) was profoundly right when he
pointed out that critical thinking is the basic element for the growth of knowl-
edge, I thought this would be an excellent opportunity to confront and criticize
different views on crime. I must admit, however, that the discussion had a tough
start when professor Christie stated in his plenary address: “I do not think crime
exists”.
Giving a reply to that assertion, I pointed out at the end of my plenary address
that the denial of crime implies also the denial of the offenders and the victims. If
crime does not exist, then victims of crime do not exist either, and the whole field
of victimology should disappear. Of course I agree with the general opinion that
crime as well as crime statistics are social constructs. However, it must be kept in
mind that the concept of social construct is also a social construct, because lan-
guage itself is a social construct. In practice, it is very difficult to explain to a per-
son who has been raped that she or he has not been the victim of a crime, because
crime does not exist. Therefore, a good way to start a discussion would be to try
to find a common field to talk, for example, about behaviours such as intention-
ally killing a person, inflicting a bodily injury on another person with intent, or
depriving a person or an organization of property, as well as about the social reac-
tion to them.
As there was not enough time in the plenary session to continue the discus-
sion, professor Christie gave a short speech during the dinner organized by the
Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology in which he pointed out that his
assertion should not be taken literally. In my opinion, the problem with that line
of arguing is that it puts the discussion right out of the field of science. An asser-
tion that cannot be taken literally cannot be falsified. It is impossible to prove that
an author is wrong when you cannot establish precisely what he or she means.
Another interesting and related topic of discussion emerged when, in his ple-
nary address, professor Christie criticized the use of crime statistics by criminol-
ogists. The critique was not new but, paradoxically, he was also using crime sta-
tistics in his presentation. Professor Christie showed prison statistics from Fin-
land and argued that the decrease in the number of prisoners that took place dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century was the result of a form of re-integrative
shaming from the part of the authorities. In fact, the case of Finland has also been
studied by Kuhn (1997) and Törnudd (1993) among others and is probably the best
illustration that the decrease of the prison population in a country is to a large ex-
tent the result of a political decision. Interestingly enough, the only way to know if
the prison population of a country is high or low is to compare it with the prison
population of other countries, and this can only be done through the use of prison
statistics such as the ones produced by the Council of Europe (2003). Moreover,
the best way to show that prison populations are not related to crime rates is to
compare them with police and court statistics (see Aebi & Kuhn, 2000). Thus, a
radical opposition to the use of crime statistics does not seem very fruitful.
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However, during the different discussions with professor Christie as well as
with other critical criminologists, I could not help feeling somehow uncomfort-
able, because I always had the impression of discussing with people with whom I
have a lot in common. As I see it, critical criminology was the transposition to the
field of criminology of the ideas that prevailed among the youth of the 1960s and
1970s, a generation known in French as les soixante-huitards (i.e. the May 1968
rebels). Such ideas were inspired by the perception of the word as a particularly
unjust place, and I totally agree with that perception. In fact, life becomes almost
unbearable when one tries to think of the number of injustices that are being
committed at this very same moment. Nevertheless, I think that critical criminol-
ogists made a big mistake when they mixed political engagement with science,
because it is a well-known fact that a militant is rarely objective.
Moreover, I think that their radical positions only made things worse during
the last twenty-five years. The main message of critical criminology in the 1970s
was that crime was not a real problem (“crime does not exist”). As a conse-
quence, the progressive political parties—in which critical criminologists were
engaged—never developed a criminal policy. Such a decision, taken in a period
of constant growth of delinquency according to all crime measures (Braithwaite,
1989: 49; and Killias, 2001: 113, both with references), was completely irratio-
nal and helped indirectly the growth of the most conservative criminal policies.
The situation is now critical as extreme right-wing European parties continue to
rise by promising simplistic solutions to crime.
I hope that in the future critical criminologists and non-critical criminologists
will finally manage to work together as a scientific community and help improv-
ing that situation, but this may well be the task of the new generation of criminol-
ogists. In fact, the first generation of critical criminologists grew up and devel-
oped its ideas in a completely different context. Thirty years ago, confrontation
was a way of living and one could dream of utopias by the side of the fire pro-
vided by the Welfare State. Nowadays, we are trying not to lose what is left of
that State. “The times they are a-changing”, said the poet Bob Dylan, a verse that
could be followed by those of T. S. Eliot that always come to my mind when I
read the essays written in those years: “time is always time, and place is always
and only place, and what is actual is actual only for one time and only for one
place.”
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Abstract
The International Crime Survey (ICVS) is a well established research instrument
in the industrialised world. It has already been repeated four times since 1989
with the regular participation of several Western European countries. Since
1992, a growing number of Central-Eastern European countries have started tak-
ing part in the ICVS. The responsibility for such surveys was taken forward
largely by UNICRI, which was keen to sensitise governments of former socialist
countries on the dimensions and extent of crime in their urban areas—especially
as police data on crime were often poor. The ICVS database today contains infor-
mation on a total of thirty-three European countries that have participated in the
survey at least once. On average, approximately 28% of European citizens suf-
fered at least one form of victimisation over the twelve months preceding the in-
terview. Analysis in this paper will focus in particular on the findings of the 2000
ICVS and trends between 1996 and 2000. Trends analysis is made possible by
comparing victimisation rates in those countries which took part in both the 1996
and 2000 sweeps of the ICVS. Such a comparison reveals that victimisation rates
are generally consistent and only modest variations have been registered, with an
overall trend downwards for the three types of crime considered (burglary, rob-
bery and assault with force). Further analysis deals with crimes reported to the
police and differences observed among participating countries that highlight the
relationship between citizens’ perception of the police and reporting patterns.
Introduction
The International Crime Survey (ICVS) started in 1989 and has been repeated
four times since then. It is a household survey, the major characteristic of which
is addressing citizens’ experience of crime and victimisation in a standardised
way in all participating countries. The ICVS started and further developed as a
telephone interview in most participating countries1.This limited its scope to the
most affluent regions of the world (Western Europe, North America, Japan).
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1 Most European surveys adopted the CATI method since 1989. However, it is widely recognized that telephone surveys
are best when telephone penetration is over 80% of households.
However, the organizers understood the potential of the ICVS in collecting
“truly” comparable information on victimisation experience of citizens and
started looking for opportunities to increase the participation of former socialist
and developing countries.
Since 1992, through the involvement of the United Nations2, face-to-face sur-
veys using the ICVS questionnaire started spreading in a growing number of
Central-Eastern European countries, also thanks to grants and contributions
from various donors who believed in the ICVS as a tool to collect crucial infor-
mation for the development of evidence-based crime prevention and criminal
justice strategies. Special attention was paid to the usefulness of survey results in
complementing administrative data on crime, which were often scarce in the re-
gion, and in assisting initiatives aimed at increasing citizens’ participation in
crime prevention and police reform.
General objectives of the ICVS
The ICVS shares most of its objectives with all victim surveys. Its peculiarity
rests in standardisation and international comparability of the results. The main
objective is providing comparative indicators of crime and victimisation risks,
public perception of crime and fear of crime, performance of law enforcement,
activities of victim assistance services and use of measures for crime prevention
at the household level.
Another important objective is promoting crime surveys as a research and pol-
icy tool at the international, national and local levels: in some participating coun-
tries the ICVS represents the first opportunity to test survey methodology in the
area of crime prevention and security. In this respect, the ICVS also aims at en-
hancing adequate research and policy analysis methodology and promoting in-
ternational co-operation by providing an opportunity for a large number of coun-
tries to share methodology and experience through their participation in a well
co-ordinated international research project.
In many countries the ICVS contributes to creating an opportunity for trans-
parency in public debate about crime and reactions to crime and strengthening
public and criminal justice concerns about citizens’ participation in the evalua-
tion of criminal policy and particularly in partnership in crime prevention.
Structure of the ICVS
The ICVS is a household survey that uses a standard questionnaire in all partici-
pating countries. Between 1,500 and 2,000 households are interviewed in each
country/city. To date the database contains more than 220,000 cases. The ICVS
questionnaire covers conventional / volume crime by including questions on
eleven types of crime against the household and individual. Furthermore it ad-
dresses the issues of consumer fraud/cheating and bribery/corruption. For each
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2 Firstly the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and recently the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
type of crime experienced, reporting to the police and reasons for reporting or not
reporting are asked. Finally the ICVS questionnaire deals with attitudes towards
the police; victim support; crime prevention measures at the household level;
fear of crime/feelings of safety; and attitudes towards punishment.
In order to limit the cost of the surveys conducted with the face-to-face meth-
odology, in Central-Eastern Europe only samples from the capital city of each
participating country were interviewed.3
It should be noted that victimisation rates in urban areas are generally higher
than those observed when both urban and rural contexts are considered. Figure 1
refers to seventeen industrialised countries in which the survey was conducted at
the national level in 2000. Victimisation rates at the urban level are notably
higher than those observed at the national level.4
Analysis of trends 1996–2000 in Europe
Analysis of trends 1996–2000 refers to urban areas in six Western European
countries and capital cities in fifteen Central-Eastern European countries (see
Table 1). Trends analysis is made possible by comparing only those countries
which took part in both the 1996 and 2000 sweeps of the ICVS.5
Due to the different methodologies and contexts, analysis will refer to West-
ern and Central-Eastern European cities as two separate groups. Data presented











Overall victimization by eleven types of crime
urban
national
Figure 1. Overall victimisation rates, one year, by eleven types of crime in
seventeen industrialized countries, 2000
3 In this article, comparisons across European countries participating in the ICVS refer to city surveys and respondents
from national surveys living in urban areas of 100,000 population and more.
4 For this reason, straightforward comparison with data published in van Kesteren, Mayhew and Nieuwbeerta (2000) is
not possible.
5 Analysis here excludes data from the cities of Baku (Azerbaijan), which parrticipated only in 2000 and Belgrade (Ser-
bia), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Bratislava (Slovak Republic) and Skopje (FYR Macedonia) that participated in 1996/97
only. Data from Denmark, Spain and Switzerland (2000 only) and Malta (1997 only), are also excluded.
Overall victimisation in European cities
The ICVS questionnaire includes eleven types of crime, as follows:
A. Car-related crimes
• Theft of car
• Theft from car
• Car vandalism






• Sexual incidents (women only)
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Cities in Central-Eastern Europe 1996 2000 Type of survey
(2000)
Survey method (2000)
Bucharest (Romania) x x city face-to-face
Budapest (Hungary) x x city CATI
Kiev (Ukraine) x (97) x city face-to-face
Ljubljana (Slovenia) x (97) x (01) national CATI
Minsk (Belarus) x (97) x city face-to-face
Moscow (Russia) x x city CATI
Prague (Czech Rep.) x x city CATI
Riga (Latvia) x x city face-to-face
Sofia (Bulgaria) x (97) x city face-to-face
Tallinn (Estonia) x (95) x national face-to-face CAPI
Tblisi (Georgia) x x city face-to-face
Tirana (Albania) x x city face-to-face
Vilnius (Lithuania) x (97) x city face-to-face
Warsaw (Poland) x x city face-to-face
Zagreb (Croatia) x (97) x city face-to-face
Urban areas in Western Europe
England & Wales x x national CATI
Finland x x national CATI
Netherlands x x national CATI
Northern Ireland x x national face-to-face
Scotland x x national CATI
Sweden x x national CATI
Table 1. European countries/cities participating in the ICVS 1996 and 2000, type and method of
survey
D. Other property crimes
• Theft of bicycle
• Theft of motorcycle
• Theft of personal property
The overall rates of victimisation for the eleven types of crime were identical in
the two groups in 1996 and remained identical in 2000, showing the same de-
crease by 4 percentage points (from 32% to 28%—see Figure 2). This incredible
result is nevertheless the product of two quite different situations in the two parts
of Europe.
As Table 2 can show, the contribution of the different types of crime to the
overall victimisation rate is slightly different, especially as regards contact crime
(that is higher) and burglary (lower) in the Western European urban areas. How-
ever, in both groups the majority of incidents referred to car-related crime fol-
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Figure 2. Overall victimisation by eleven types of crime in Western European urban
areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996 and 2000






1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000
Central-Eastern Europe 20.8 18.6 14.0 14.6 37.4 39.5 27.8 27.4
Western Europe 26.6 25.6 9.6 10.9 39.1 36.4 24.7 27.1
Table 2. Profile of crime in Central-Eastern European cities and Western European urban areas,
1996 and 2000 (calculation based on number of incidents)
Crimes reported to the police
Another important difference between the two groups is represented by the per-
centage of crimes that were reported to the police. Figure 3 shows that in general
crimes were more frequently reported to the police in the West. In 1996, 48% of
the victims in Western Europe declared having reported the most recent crime
experienced to the police. This percentage increased to 52% in 2000. In Cen-
tral-Eastern European cities only 32% of the victims reported to the police in
1996. An increase was also observed in 2000, but of much smaller proportion
(only 2%). This finding shows that, in a situation in which the levels of victimisa-
tion were the same, 18% more victims requested formal action from the police in
Western Europe than in Central-Eastern Europe.
However, from a police-community point of view, a trend towards more crime
reported is welcome since it shows increased confidence in the role of the police
after a crime is committed. For example, it is more and more frequent that house-
holds and cars are insured and the insurance settlement can be effected only fol-
lowing a proper reporting to the authorities in charge. Of course, insurance can-
not prevent crime but it is one of the measures that citizens adopt in order to limit
the financial consequences of crime. Increased reporting to the police may also
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Figure 3. Percentage of victims who reported crimes to the police (average of
11 crimes) in Western European urban areas and Central-Eastern European
cities, 1996 and 2000
Trends in specific crimes
Apart from overall victimisation rates, attention should be paid to specific types
of crime. The following analysis refers to trends 1996–2000 as regards victimi-
sation from burglary, robbery and assault with force.6 Figure 4 shows that vic-
timisation from burglaries and robberies was higher in Central-Eastern Euro-
pean cities while assault with force was more frequent in the Western European
areas. Trends down between 1996 and 2000 were observed for all types of crime
in both groups, with the only exception of assault with force in Western Europe
that was stable.
Domestic burglary
Burglary is the typical household crime. Furthermore, domestic burglary is consid-
ered a very solid indicator in the ICVS, with a clear definition7 that allows for
common understanding across cultures. Rates of victimisation are very low
across Europe, although slightly lower in the West, but the general trend as re-
gards prevalence is towards a decrease (see Figure 5). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the percentage of incidents has increased in Central-Eastern European
cities between 1996 and 2000. This indicates that a smaller percentage of house-
holds has been victimised more frequently. It may also indicate a delay in the
“target hardening” process that has been put in place by many Western European
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Burglary Robbery Assault with force
Figure 4. Trends in victimisation for burglary, robbery and assault with force in Western European
urban areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996 and 2000
6 Analysis refers to selected victimisation experience of assault with force, thus excluding victims of threats (no force
used).
7 “Over the past five years, did anyone actually get into your home/residence without permission, and steal or try to steal
something?” Interviewers are also instructed to make sure that the incident happened at the respondent’s main resi-
dence (second houses are excluded, as well as garages and sheds). Unsuccessful attempts are recorded separately.
devices. Previous analysis has demonstrated that such devices are generally in-
stalled after the first burglary and helped in preventing a second one. This may
not be happening in Central-Eastern European cities.
The levels of reporting to the police are different in the two groups (Figure 6).
While in the West the very high level of reporting observed in 1996 went up
above 80% in 2000, in Central-Eastern European cities the level of reporting in
2000 was lower than in 1996. This negative trend goes against the overall trend
for reporting crimes that is going up as shown in Figure 3. The experience of bur-
glary is quite dramatic, with a clear invasion of privacy and very often a monetary
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Figure 5. Victimisation rates for burglary, prevalence and incidence, in Western
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Figure 6. Percentage of respondents who reported burglary to the police in Western
European urban areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996 and 2000
The perceived seriousness of the incident, measured on a three-point scale (1
not very serious, 2 fairly serious and 3 very serious) showed exactly the same lev-
els in the two groups (Figure 7). If the perceived gravity of the incidents is the
same, other reasons should be found to explain the different reporting behaviour.
Although burglary rates are very similar in the two groups, the respondents
from Central-Eastern European cities feared someone would be likely to break
and enter their household much more frequently than those in the West. Figure 8
shows that burglary in the next twelve months was likely or very likely for 44%
of the Central-Eastern European respondents in 1996 and 2000. In the West, this
was true for a much lower percentage of respondents (28% in 1996 that de-
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Figure 7. Perceived seriousness of burglary in Western European urban areas and











Western Europe Central-Eastern Europe
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Figure 8. Likelihood of burglary in the next twelve months, Western European
urban areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996 and 2000 (response
categories “likely” and “very likely” combined)
It appears therefore that respondents from Central-Eastern European cities
did not feel protected against burglary, and that may probably relate to a histori-
cal lack of confidence in the police that is more evident when the police are called
to deal with and investigate property crimes.
People who report theft to the police—including burglary—very often expect
them to recover the money, find the offender, be able to somehow redress the sit-
uation and bring some compensation. The ICVS asked victims who reported to
the police about their satisfaction with the treatment received. How did the police
respond (see Figure 9)? In Western Europe apparently well, with the share of sat-
isfied customers going up and reaching 78% in 2000. The level of satisfaction
with the police upon reporting burglary in Central-Eastern European cities is in-
stead very low and almost stable (from 33% to 34% between 1996 and 2000).
Only one-third of citizens who reported said they were satisfied with what the
police did afterwards.
The analysis of the reasons for dissatisfaction very frequently brought up the
issue of not recovering property or not finding the offenders, but also revealed
that very frequently victims complain about the police being impolite, not being
interested at all in the case, being slow and not keeping them informed about
progress in the investigation. The lack of confidence in the police in Cen-
tral-Eastern European countries often has its roots in the perception of the police
being corrupt. The ICVS 2000 in nine Central-Eastern European cities included
a question that was not asked in the West about likelihood of the police accepting
money in exchange of help.8 Results showed that on average 66% of the respon-
dents declared it was likely that the police would accept money to discharge their
duties. Nevertheless, talking corruption is still a very sensitive issue since ap-













Western Europe Central-Eastern Europe
Good job (fairly good +
very good)
Not a good job
(fairly poor + very poor)
Don t know
Figure 9. Level of satisfaction with the police upon reporting burglary in Western
European urban areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996 and 2000
8 “Is it likely that a citizen would have to offer money, a present or a favour (i.e., more than official charge), to get help
from the police?”
A possible explanation comes from the analysis of the overall behaviour of the
samples interviewed (victims-non victims) as regards their satisfaction with the
performance of the police in preventing and controlling crime in their area. In the
2000 survey (see Figure 10) 60% of the respondents in Western Europe said the
police did either a fairly good or a very good job, while only 26% were not happy
with their work. In Eastern-Central European cities instead those satisfied were
only 40% against the majority (49%) who said that the police did not do a good
job. The 2000 data are not directly comparable with 1996 because of a change in
the questionnaire as regards the categories of response to the police question.
While in the past three responses were possible (police do a good job, a bad job
and don’t know), there are now five (police do a fairly good job, a very good job,
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Figure 10. Level of satisfaction with the police (general), in Western European












Western Europe Central-Eastern Europe
Good job
Not a good job
Don’t know
Figure 11. Level of satisfaction with the police (general), in Western European
urban areas and Central-Eastern European cities, 1996
son with precaution, by observing Figure 11 that refers to 1996 it appears that
there has been an increase in the percentage of people satisfied in both groups of
countries/cities. A notable change is the decrease in the percentage of those who
said “don’t know” in Eastern-Central Europe.
Conclusions
Two major findings appear from the analysis of the ICVS results in European cit-
ies and urban areas: a) very small variations were observed between 1996 and
2000 and b) overall victimisation rates were the same throughout Europe and
showed the same trend down.
However, apart from similarities, the analysis also revealed some differences
in the profile of crime (more burglaries in Central-Eastern Europe and more con-
tact crimes in Western Europe). Furthermore, in-depth analysis of burglaries re-
vealed that incidence was higher in Central-Eastern European cities and showing
a trend towards increase. While the perception of seriousness of burglary was the
same in the two groups, fear of burglary was much higher in Central-Eastern Eu-
rope.
The biggest differences between the groups were however observed as re-
gards attitudes towards the police, starting with reporting patterns. The percent-
age of burglaries reported to the police was much lower in Central-Eastern Eu-
rope, where victims were also frequently dissatisfied with what the police did
with their reports. The overall confidence in the police and satisfaction with the
police upon reporting increased between 1996 and 2000 but still remained at a
much lower level in Central-Eastern Europe.
The results of the ICVS confirm once again that it is necessary to integrate po-
lice records of crime with survey data in order to get a more accurate picture of
the crime situation. Information obtained through the survey is also crucial for
the police in the participating countries in order to monitor their performance and
citizens’ attitudes in that respect. While this type of information is present to
some extent in Western Europe, there is still very little information available
from Central-Eastern Europe. With the forthcoming accession of 10 new EU
members, it would be extremely important to start collecting data with a regular
European victim survey, still comparable with the rest of the world. The ICVS
may represent a very good tool to assist efforts in this direction, especially those
recently initiated by the European Commission.
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Abstract
This contribution looks at the implications for the emerging European transna-
tional criminal justice system (otherwise known as the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice (AFSJ)) of the recent ‘constitutional’initiative taken by the Euro-
pean Union Convention on the Future of Europe under Giscard d’Estaing—an
initiative whose fate now lies in the hands of the Intergovernmental Council
meeting under the Italian presidency of the European Council in the autumn of
this year. The contribution contrasts two themes within the emerging constitu-
tional framework, and on the basis of how these two themes are articulated and
their relative priority within the ongoing constitutional debate, it looks at the op-
portunities and dangers of the constitutionalization process in terms of certain
fundamental tensions or oppositions in the emerging AFSJ.
One theme within the constitutional project is highly instrumental. It views
the constitution-building process as just one more opportunity (after the Treaties
of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) and the Tampere Programme
(1999)) to develop the scope and competence of the European polity within vari-
ous policy areas. This expansionist mindset is nowhere more prominent than
within the relatively new and still significantly underdeveloped area of FSJ, par-
ticularly in the light of the ‘securitization’ climate that has emerged since the
Twin Towers attack on 9/11. The other theme within the constitutional project is
more normative in nature. It views the constitution-building process as an oppor-
tunity to subject the incrementally developed structure of the EU to ‘constitu-
tional discipline’ for the first time. The emphasis here is upon the regulation of
powers already granted, whether by ‘external’ democratic, judicial or adminis-
trative means, or by ‘internal’ monitoring within institutions or new checks and
balances between institutions. Clearly neither of these themes or tendencies can
exist in isolation. A constitution is always about both ‘constituting’and ‘regulat-
ing’—they are two sides of the same conceptual coin. Yet the emphasis may dif-
fer markedly—there may be more or less stress upon one rather than the other,
and the combination of the two may be more or less optimal. In turn, the balance
achieved between these two conceptions is likely to have important implications
for certain issues which have been and remain at the centre of AFSJ—namely the
balance between intergovernmental (state-based) and supranational (central) au-
thority, between legislative and executive empowerment, between proactive and
reactive programmes, and—most generally of all—between accountability and
effectiveness.
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The contribution offers some thoughts on how the constitutional process is in
fact managing the balance between ‘(re)constituting’ and ‘regulating’ and what
this implies in terms of the future trajectory of AFSJ—in particular the funda-
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Warming up
Before I start I have to make two reservations—one addressed to the colleagues
with a more sociological background and one to the lawyers among you.
I have to out myself first of all as being a lawyer meaning that my main field of
academic work is the interpretation and application of norms. It is due to the tra-
ditional organisation of law studies and university research in Germany that
criminal law and criminology are still regarded to be different fields and are
therefore mainly strictly separate in personal respect, too. But in my opinion the
traditional differentiation between the world of rules and the world of social phe-
nomena is an artificial and improper view. Criminology deals with phenomena
which are mostly constructed by law. Murder cannot even be considered a crime
without a norm, which rules killing a person to be a crime. On the other hand in-
terpreting and applying and—in the first line—making law is irrational and un-
reasonable without taking into consideration the results of sociological and espe-
cially criminological research. Because of this interdependency of criminology
and legal research both disciplines complement one another and thus I have
worked together in connected projects with the criminologist at my home fac-
ulty, Klaus Boers. So I find myself today in the role I am accustomed to, which is
to contribute my legal expertise in criminological research.
On the other hand I have to ask my colleagues in legal research among the au-
ditory to show lenience when I sometimes go back to basics, which to them
might occur as being obvious and self-evident. Nothing in law is self-evident.
This should be enough of introduction and reservation; I am aware of the fact
that I will miss the expectations of half of the auditory anyway. So let us get down
to harmonisation of criminal law in Europe. I will approach the subject in two
main chapters: a more technical one concerning harmonisation in law and the
process of law-making in the European Union; and in the second part I will try to
reveal the hidden agenda—or the ideological principles which guide the criminal
policy in Europe.
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“Harmony in Law” – some definitions
I have to start with some definitions of “harmonisation” and “frictions” to make
clear how I understand and will use these terms1.
The content of law is free in a political sense, but the instructions of law-mak-
ing are universal. One of these instructions follows the simple rule that rules
must be able to rule people’s conduct. Laws have to respond to the structure of “if
... then”. That means that the law has to rule that a certain (abstractly) described
behaviour will have a certain repercussion on the addressee of the rule. I call this
the “conditional programme”. This programme is failed when you set two rules,
addressing the same person and tying different consequences to the same behav-
iour. To cut it short I will use traffic lights as an example: If traffic lights showed
“red” and “green” lights simultaneously they were no longer able to rule any-
thing. They were double-binding and would form, what I like to name a “pitfall
in law” or “frictions”. Thus I state that consistency is one of the fundamental au-
tonomous principles of law which can be regarded as “harmonious” law. The
tertium comparationis within one system of laws—for instance the laws of one
single state—is the individual as the addressee of the rules. To clarify my posi-
tion again by using as an example the traffic lights: it is obvious that red and
green light in fact must be shown simultaneously, but addressed to different per-
sons. Only from the perspective of the individual who is submitted to laws one
can both detect frictions and name the diverse elements which have to be harmo-
nised.
The addressee of rules is in my opinion the starting point, too, when it is about
to lay down the principles in according to which consistency of laws shall be es-
tablished. Every single rule has to go back to guiding principles meaning that it
has to put the principle in more concrete forms. Once a norm or a verdict counter-
acts the guiding principle of the system the result of this will be inconsistency or
frictions. I will shorten my argumentation by using again traffic as an example:
Imagine for a moment, that on an initiative of UK in order to harmonise traffic in
Europe the EU Commission regulated that all trucks should drive on the left. It
becomes totally clear, that the traffic law of all countries on the continent then all
of a sudden became inconsistent. Such a regulation would not reach the target of
harmonisation but would only cause disharmony, i.e. frictions. I will show now
that the process of law-making in the field of criminal law in Europe partly fol-
lows this example.
I sum up my definitions: Frictions in law are caused by ambiguous, equally
ranked legal orders addressing the same people. My understanding of harmoni-
sation is: It is the process of establishing a system of consistent conditional pro-
grams going back to hierarchical ordered principles and addressing the same
people.
76
1 In detail see Nelles in Klip/van der Wilt (ed.), Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law, Royal Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences, 2002, p. 31 pp.
How has penal law come to Europe—how goes
Europe into penal law?
Cross-border crimes and prosecuting them is not a new and not a specifically Eu-
ropean phenomenon. So I shortly have to go back to the classical instruments by
which States have used to deal with this problem.
International Law
These instruments form part of International Law i.e. international bilateral or
multilateral treaties covering mutual assistance and extradition. Most of the trea-
ties ruling mutual assistance are Council of Europe Conventions e.g. on Extradi-
tion (1957), Mutual assistance in criminal matters (1959) or the transfer of sen-
tenced persons (1983). The Council of Europe, which may be named as the old-
est “Europe” in legal respect, is well known by its most famous European Con-
vention of Human Rights2 and by the European Court of Human rights in
Strasbourg3. These treaties are still in force. They generally enshrine the safe-
guards and procedures traditionally applied to international co-operation in
criminal matters. These safeguards are designed for two main purposes.
• First it shall be ensured that a country does not assist in the prosecution or de-
tention of a person by another state in circumstances, which are contrary to
human rights standards4.
• Second, it must be ensured that disparities between legal systems do not result
in defendants and witnesses being placed in a worse position than they would
be under the national law of the requested country5.6
In my terms: the treaties provide principles and special procedures to avoid fric-
tions. A request of one state has to go through several procedures in the requested
country. I want to name only two of these principles: Legal assistance is only to
be given, if the crime concerned is a crime not only in the requesting but also in
the requested state (principle of dual or double criminality)7. Legal assistance
must not be given, if the principle of “ne bis in idem” was inflicted by the re-
quested state (principle of double jeopardy).8
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2 For further information see Whelan, ‘Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Third Pillar’, in
Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union, 1997, p. 205 pp.
3 Fur further information see Drzemczewski, The European Rights Convention: Protocol No. 11—Entry into Force and
First Year of Application, EHLJ 21 (2000), 1 pp.
4 Cf. Schomburg, Die Rolle des Individuums in der Internationalen Kooperation in Strafsachen, StV 1998, 153; cf.
Jung, Strafverteidigung in Europa, StV 1990, 509, 512.
5 Cf. Schomburg, Die Rolle des Individuums in der Internationalen Kooperation in Strafsachen, StV 1998, 153, 155; cf.
Jung/Schroth, Das Strafrecht als Gegenstand der Rechtsangleichung in Europa, GA 1983, 241, 242.
6 Ashworth, Binning et al., EU Co-operation in Criminal Matters, JUSTICE 2000, p. 2, 3.
7 Stessens, ‘The Joint Initiative of the France, Sweden and Belgium for the Adoption of a Council Framework Decision
on the Execution in the European Union of Orders Freezing Assets and Evidence’, in Kerchove/Weyembergh (ed.), La
reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union européenne, 2001, 92; Frieberger, ‘Mutual
Recognition of Final Decisions and Dual Criminality’, in Kerchove/Weyembergh (ed.), La reconnaissance mutuelle
des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union européenne, 2001, 161 pp.
8 Vernimmen, ‘A propos de la reconnaissance mutuelle des décision sentencielles en général’, in Kerchove/
Weyembergh (ed.), La reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union européenne, 2001,
147, 149.
On the EU level one has to face the fact, that criminal law and the right to pun-
ish are still regarded as lying within the sovereignty of nations i.e. also of the
Member States of the European Union9. The limits of Union competence are
governed by the principle of conferral and this will not be changed by the future
constitution (Art. 9 I). So up to now the Union has not been formally empowered
to establish Criminal law as such.
From this starting point international treaties have been the classical instru-
ment to rule co-operation in criminal matters within the EU, too. Since 1991 sev-
eral Conventions have been adopted under European Political Co-operation,
such as the Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure (1995), the Conven-
tion on Driving Disqualifications (1998) and the Convention on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters (2000).
The well-known Schengen agreements are also International treaties. Their
background was to form a platform for police co-operation in order to compen-
sate for facilitating the free movement of persons within Europe10. The Schengen
treaties have become part of the so-called acquis communautaire and thus are
implemented in the so-called Third Pillar of the EU11 to which I go back later.
The treaties impose the obligation to the police to co-operate in the field of prose-
cution. They authorise police i.a. to follow defendants across borders, to install
law enforcement agencies at the boundaries where the officers in fact exchanged
information on a very informal way etc.. The principle of ne bis in idem is con-
sidered in the treaties to prohibit prosecution only if the defendant has already
been convicted of the crime concerned or if further prosecution is definitely
barred by the decision of an authority after the accused has fulfilled certain obli-
gations (“Einstellung des Verfahrens nach Erfüllung von Auflagen”)12. The
Schengen agreements are regarded to form the blueprint of co-operation be-
tween and among national authorities in the field of cross-border law enforce-
ment13 in accordance with the (later) EU treaties of Amsterdam and Nizza.
But the main problem of international treaties as instruments of mutual legal
aid has been seen in the fact that most of them have not become fully effective
(even across the EU) because international treaties have to be ratified and not all
of the member states have done so with all of the conventions. The 1991 Conven-
tion on the enforcement of foreign criminal sentences for instance has never
come into force.14
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9 Nelles, Europäisierung des Strafverfahrens—Strafprozessrecht in Europa?, ZStW 1997, 727; Gleß/Lüke,
Rechtsschutz gegen grenzüberschreitende Strafverfolgung in Europa  Jura 1998, 70; Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht
als Antwort auf transnationale Kriminalität?, JA 2002, 723, 724.
10 Gleß in Eser/Lagodny/Blakesley (ed.), The Individual as Subject of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters,
2002, 51 pp.; Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht als Antwort auf transnationale Kriminalität?, JA 2002, 723, 724
11 See Protocol integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union, OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p.
93; for further information see Gleß in Eser/Lagodny/Blakesley (ed.), The Individual as Subject of International Coop-
eration in Criminal Matters, 2002, 52, 73 pp.
12 ECJ 11. 02. 2003 C-187/01 and C.385/01.
13 In detail Nelles, Europäisierung des Strafverfahrens—Strafprozessrecht für Europa, ZStW 1997, pp. 727, 728, 735
pp.; Whelan, ‘Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Third Pillar’, in Barrett (ed), Justice Coop-
eration in the European Union, 1997, p. 205 pp; Anderson et. al., Policing the European Union, Oxford 1995.
14 Bradley, ‘The Joint Initiative of the UK, France and Sweden for the Adoption of a Council Framework Decision on the
Application of the Pronciple of Mutual Recognition to Financial Penalties’, in Kerchove/Weyembergh (ed.), La re-
connaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires pénales dans l’Union européenne, 2001, 126.
European Community Law
The governments of the member states having in mind a more effective system of
mutual legal aid within the European Union but not willing to give up their sover-
eignty to punish made “Co-operation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs” to
form one of the fields of common politics of the EU. Besides this politics have
been extended also to the field of Common Foreign and Security by the treaty of
Maastricht. Since then the metaphor of a temple has been used to describe the le-
gal construction of the European Union. Actually we still have to differ between
the three so-called pillars of the European Union, which are to be given up under
provisions of the future Constitution.
• The first pillar is formed by the former European Communities (i.e. European Coal
and Steel Community; Euratom and the European [Economic] Community).
• The sector of “Common and foreign security” forms the 2nd Pillar. The Coun-
cil of the secretaries of foreign affairs and the secretaries of war has in some
way dealt with criminal matters, too, for instance by stating and updating a
Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) on the application of specific measures
to combat terrorism (updated in 2003/402/CSFP and 2003/482/CSFP). This
position contains a list of persons, groups and entities suspected of forming
part of international terrorism and of which the assets may and shall be frozen
by every member state under no additional precondition. Nevertheless for the
rest I leave out the 2nd pillar.
• The 3rd Pillar is Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA).
This differentiation between the fields of politics go along with different ways of
law-making and different legal instruments, too.
The first pillar is the domain of the EU Commission. The main legal instru-
ments are Regulations and Directives15. Regulations are binding in their entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States. Directives, however, are not di-
rectly applicable but are binding on the Member States as to be converted into do-
mestic law. Directives not converted within the specified time limit may be in-
voked by individuals against a State16 as well as between individuals17.
In the 3rd Pillar (besides the classical measures of International Law) instru-
ments as follows are foreseen: co-operation and joint actions, Council Decisions
and Framework Decisions18. They are not directly applicable. But Framework
Decisions are legislative acts binding, as to the result to be achieved, on the mem-
ber states leaving them free to choose the form of achieving the results.19 I will go
on to this later.
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15 Art. 249 ECT
16 Case 33/70, SACE (1970) ECR 1213 (directives; direct applicability); Joint cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich
(1991) ECR I – 5357 (state liability for breach of community law).
17 Case 481/99, Heininger (2001) ECR (13 December 2001); this judgement is to be found on the homepage of the ECJ
(http://curia.eu.int/en/transitpage.htm).
18 Cf. Art. 34 paragraph 2 EUT.
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a) First Pillar
Although it might occur that questions of penal law are only raised in the third
pillar, it was within the first pillar that a partial approximation of substantive pe-
nal laws was initiated. This is grounded on the Jurisdiction of the European Court
of Justice (the leading case is the famous Greek Maize case of 198920) and
amendments of the Amsterdam Treaties (Art. 209A) providing—roughly spo-
ken—that member states shall take the same measure to counter fraud affecting
the financial interest of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting
their own financial interests.21 The Court added that the measures taken should in
every case confer on the sanction “an effective, proportionate and dissuasive
character”. Here we meet the starting-point of one of the actual principles of
EU’s criminal policy.
Besides this the Community created within the first pillar a series of “non-pe-
nal” sanctions such as administrative fines or exclusion from entitlement to fur-
ther public subsidies.22 These sanctions primarily based on competition law can
be regarded as what we call in Germany “Ordnunsgwidrigkeitenrecht”. The dif-
ference between penalties and administrative sanctions is only gradual, not es-
sential. Administrative sanctions are estimated not to contain an ethical charge of
wrongfulness but only the charge of having inflicted a rule. This is where meta-
physics are brought in. To shorten it: It is obvious that in this field conflicts may
arise between national penal law and EC law which is directly applicable, too.
Also within the first pillar OLAF23 has been created. The Commission has
bundled step by step its competence to counteract fraud, corruption and other
unwrongful acts against the financial interests of the EU in one Unit for the fight
against fraud. (UCLAF which was transformed into an independent Office in
1999). OLAF inter alia exercises (under Regulation (EC) 1073/1999) the power
to carry out on-the-spot inspections and checks on the territory of the Member
States. Investigations are intended “for the detection of serious or transnational
irregularities that may involve economic operators acting in Several Member
States”. The Member States are obliged to co-operate and to give necessary sup-
port to the Officers of OLAF and to forward documents and information relating
to investigations. OLAF’s reports shall constitute admissible evidence in admin-
istrative or judicial proceedings of the member State in which their use proves
necessary. The right of the suspected and checked persons especially to legal
protection is not ruled. OLAF is strictly bound to efficacy. This European Office
for fight against fraud, OLAF, can be regarded as a model for the European ap-
proach to procedural penal law.
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EU: Especially the Third Pillar
The instruments which were foreseen in the treaty of Maastricht establishing the
EU and thus the 3rd pillar, too, were besides the classical measures of Interna-
tional Law, co-operation and joint actions. In my opinion “co-operation” has
been the most effective instrument not to harmonise penal law in Europe but to
produce the need of harmonisation. Co-operation takes place in formal as well as
in informal ways. Once official authorities are encouraged to co-operate infor-
mally, to form networks, to get familiar with the laws of the other member states,
to make friends with each other on a very personal level, they are on the slippery
slope of collusion. Forum-shopping24 is a well known term, meaning that prose-
cutors can come to an agreement about where to bring a case to court. I mean that
even “authority-shopping”25 has become possible, meaning that the police for
instance “chase” a suspect across borders until he finally reaches a member state
with the lowest hurdle to obtain special evidence. It is obvious that within a sys-
tem of informality formal restrictions lose their function as safeguards of indi-
vidual rights against governmental power. Thus informal co-operation and a fair
process have to be regarded as a contradictio in adjecto. Procedures are no longer
transparent and legal protection is mostly out of sight.
Moreover a number of new institutions and offices has been installed. I will
only mention Europol, the European Judicial Network (EJN) and Eurojust which
is supposed to form the nucleus of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office.26
Europol and Eurojust are independent Offices with personal immunity of their
officers. They are out of individual accountability and legal control.27 Only some
institutional supervision is provided resulting mostly in self-important reports of
the fore-mentioned institutions.28
This development within the 3rd pillar has been additionally pushed by the
treaty of Amsterdam providing as a new instrument the Council framework deci-
sion. Framework decisions are legislative acts binding, as to the result to be
achieved, on the member states but leaving them free to choose the form of
achieving the results29. Since 1999 an increasing number (going to the number of
about 30) of such framework decisions have been set into force following the ac-
tion plan of the Council (of Tampere) on how to implement the provisions of the
treaty of Amsterdam establishing the so called “area of freedom, security and
justice”.
The most famous in the field of substantive law is the framework decision on
terrorism (13.06.2002)30and in the field of procedural law it is the framework de-
cision on the European arrest warrant (13.06.2002)31. Without going into details
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I will just name some framework decisions which have been adopted in the re-
cent year:
Council framework decision
• on the protection of the environment through criminal law (27.1.2003)32
• on combating corruption in the private sector (22.7.2003)33
• on the execution in the European Union of orders of freezing property or evi-
dence (22.7.2003)34
A Council Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual rec-
ognition to financial penalties (Initiative of UK, France and Sweden; OJ C 278,
2. 20. 2001) is on the agenda of the Council. At the Council meeting of 8 May
2003 the Council announced to be willing to formally adopt this Decision at one
of its next forthcoming meetings. First conclusions have been adopted on the
tracing of the use of prepaid mobile cards in order to facilitate criminal investiga-
tions.
As far as substantive law is concerned the framework decisions tend to be
more than just frameworks.35 The framework decision on combating corruption
for instance defines in detail and even down to the wording the conducts which
shall constitute a crime. With regard to penalties and sanctions these framework
decisions operate with minimum and maximum rules. In the field of corruption
for instance the conducts referred to shall be “punishable by a penalty of a maxi-
mum of at least one to three years of imprisonment”. One could presume that
these measures in fact lead to a more “harmonious” penal law in Europe, but in
my opinion it is the other way round. Every country has its own criminal law
which is embedded in legal and social culture36. Prescribing the conducts as well
as the legal threat of punishment causes frictions. Sanctions themselves have to
follow the rule of proportionality and this has as a precondition that the whole
system of sanctions is coherent.
With regard to procedural criminal law I will take the most recent framework
decision on the execution of orders freezing property as an example37: A list of
offences is given in the framework decision that shall not—or: no longer—be
subject to verification of the double criminality of the act38—a principle which I
explained before in the context of international law. Freezing orders have to be
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executed in every member state under the only precondition that the specific cer-
tifications and forms are used which are laid down in the annex of the framework
decision. The list of offences is formulated in necessarily generic terms, to cover
the field of concerning offences in the national criminal laws. Thus we find for
instance offences as “laundering of the proceeds of crime”, “racism and xeno-
phobia”, “swindling” or “sabotage”. It is up to the member states to confer this
list into their own criminal law. This will probably avoid frictions within the law
of one country, but will cause frictions when it comes to execution of freezing or-
ders. It is not at all self-evident, that freezing orders relate to the same crime in
terms of the principle of “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”.
This principle states, that there is no crime and not punishment without a law
stipulating that a certain and legally defined conduct is regarded to be crime and
to be punished as a crime before this act is committed.39 This principle does not
go back to Nils Christie in the first line—but to Cicero. This principle hence has
been guiding jurisdiction in every European state since more than 2000 years.
And it seems to fade away in the European Union.40
Ruling principles of the actual criminal policy
I now will come to some preliminary results and will roughly outline where and
how Europeanisation in criminal law actually causes frictions and thus leads to a
disharmonious law in my understanding of the term.
The term “Harmonisation” in matters of criminal law has been used as a politi-
cal motto and is in the heart of a strategy which shall insinuate that there really is
a problem, called “disharmony” and that this problem has to be eliminated. In my
view within the criminal policy of Europe the term of harmony is used only from
the perspective of government i.e. not considering the citizen as the addressee of
laws and not taking into account the effects on the rights of the individual. This
leads to the assumption, that harmony is meant as a state of similarity of rules of
investigation.
So what is the hidden agenda and what are the guiding principles of
Europeanisation of criminal law?
The aim is to form the so called “area of freedom, security and justice”. In my
opinion the attributes have become inverted. The guideline of the criminal policy is:
1. “Security” first!
There is a tension between security and freedom. Freedom is necessarily
connected to a certain state of insecurity. Life is a most insecure situation and
it must even be regarded as being of mortal danger! From the perspective of
the government, however, freedom itself is looked at as being the source of
insecurity. Freedom contains the freedom to decide between—putting it in
every day language—acting good or acting bad. So leaving people free
means running the risk that they opt for the bad. This leads to the assumption
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that the free citizen himself is risky and therefore is in principle in opposition
to security. From this the conclusion is simple: The real risk is freedom and
the real enemy of the security—in principle and in general—is the free citi-
zen. This approach to criminal policy leads to what we call in Germany
“Feindstrafrecht” which is characterised as deeply illiberal.
2. “Fight” against crime
So the second principle is that crime has to be combated, that one has to fight
it. There is a war to be led against everything named “crime”. The weapons
are:
– a substantive law covering nearly all sectors of private, social, economic
and public life
– “Effective, persuasive and deterrent sanctions”—to which Nicola Padfield
will refer
– procedures which are widely delivered from safeguards for individual
rights, which are regarded as only to restrain the investigation authorities
and to hinder criminal law as being fully effective.
3. The Principle of mutual recognition
is one of the new instruments to remove the rights of the individual also from
cross-border investigation and mutual assistance in the classical understand-
ing. In my opinion the actors of European criminal policy who in fact are the
representatives of the member states’governments i.e. the Council have only
copied principles from the first pillar, i.e. the “Free movement of goods” and
implemented them into the 3rd. Evidence, frozen assets, surveillance, data
collection, interception of communications etc. seem to be regarded as gov-
ernmental “goods” which then shall and must be moved free. Here, too, we
must notice, that the individual, the citizen as the addressee of laws is of no
relevance any longer and left aside.
Freedom first
What can be done? To my opinion we have to raise the principles on their feet
again, which means “freedom first”, to probably reach a standard of bringing
freedom and security into a balance.
This means in practice to lobby the national ministries of justice and the min-
istries of home affairs, to confront them with results of criminological and legal
research; it also means to do lobbying work on the European level. But to ask for
this from you as members of the ESC means to bring owls to Athens (or as I
found it translated in my dictionary: to bring coals to Newcastle).
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Harmonising of Sentencing:
Will It Encourage a Principled
Approach?
Nicola Padfield
Senior Lecturer, Institute of Criminology,
University of Cambridge, UK
It is a great honour to be invited to address this conference, especially under the
important heading of the Europeanisation of criminal law. The subject raises
many themes of great importance and I am delighted to play some small part in
the developing debate. It is a particular pleasure to be here in Helsinki. During
the harmonisation project which I’ll be discussing in this paper, I said loudly
more than once that I would be tempted to move England and Wales into Finnish
territorial waters, at least when it came to criminal justice policy, that is. It is
wonderful to enjoy these Helsinki waters myself!
Professor Walker yesterday painted, I thought, an ambivalent picture of cur-
rent changes in the European Union. He pointed out 5 areas where having a con-
stitution might make a difference. Perhaps it is this ‘might’, this uncertainty at
the heart of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which makes me nervous.
Professor Nelles in her presentation explored the legal framework in which
harmonisation is taking place. She gave examples of recent developments such
as the European Arrest Warrant, the Framework Decision on terrorism, and the
draft Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of financial penalties.
There are, I think, two preliminary questions which we should ask before we pro-
ceed further. First, this conference is entitled Crime and Crime Control in an In-
tegrating Europe. Are we an integrating Europe? If so, what do we understand by
this ‘integrating Europe’? I was interested to hear the Minister of Justice, when
he opened this conference, say that definitions within the European Union be-
come ever more important and problematic. My second preliminary question,
What do we mean by harmonization, I will return to later on, but we should bear
in mind the problematic meaning of the term from the beginning.
Perhaps I reflect typical British scepticism about decision-making in the EU
but I am supported by what the Dutchman, Tim Boekhout van Solinge, says in
his fascinating book on Drugs and Decision-making in the European Union1. He
says in the context of drugs policy (but it is applicable to the area I am looking at):
It is hard to detect any consistent line in the EU’s various action plans and
strategies on drugs. Outsiders may imagine that such plans arise as a result of
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detailed discussions with frontline organisations, external experts and NGOs.
The truth is rather different. They are basically bureaucratic products drawn
up by a small circle of officials to whom it may seem a fairly routine job,
amounting to a comprehensive list of possible measures and intentions in a
variety of areas. The officials seek little contact with civil society or any other
part of the outside world while working on them. The result is a wide-ranging
and fairly inscrutable array of possibilities that is scarcely serviceable as a
basis for specific measures.
Professor Wiles spoke earlier in the week of the traditional enlightenment liberal
elite having lost widespread public support. It is I think problematic that Euro-
pean Union decision-makers do not appear to have widespread public support.
In this presentation I would like to highlight some of the conclusions which I
have drawn from the research project of which I was fortunate to be a part, a pro-
ject2 led by Professor Mireille Delmas Marty then of the University of Paris 1,
now of the Collège de France. I am delighted that two colleagues from the project
are here today. We were encouraged by our European Union funders to concen-




These areas are of course not the main stream of criminal law. It was curious to
embark on a preliminary harmonisation project which concentrated on what
might be seen as exceptional crimes. But these three areas were chosen because
of their perceived importance to the European Union’s objective of creating a
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing
common action among the Member States. There are already Framework Deci-
sions moving us towards harmonisation in these areas, and of course the Council
of Europe has also been busy in the environmental context. Developing common
action does not necessarily mean harmonisation. In fact, common action on judi-
cial co-operation in criminal matters includes compatibility in rules and accord-
ing to the Nice Treaty, article 31, ‘progressively adopting measures establishing
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penal-
ties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking’. One of
the questions I want to raise this morning is whether harmonisation would inevi-
tably mean a tougher, harsher, regime. I want to raise the danger of what might be
called ‘symbolic politics’3.
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The Project
Let me describe to you the Harmonisation Project of which I was a part. The first
stage was a questionnaire sent to the 14 country representatives in early 2002
asking us to respond in writing to such questions as:
• Does your law have minimum penalties?
• Does your law allow the sentencer to reduce the punishment because of
mitigating circumstances?
• Does your law allow the judge to increase the punishment above the permitted
maximum because of aggravating circumstances?
• Are life sentences permitted in your country?
So far so good. You will find the results published in L’Harmonisation des Sanc-
tions Pénales en Europe4 which contains not only individual country reports but
also some hundred pages of tables, which attempt to set out a synthesis of the dif-
ferent sentencing rules applicable in the 14 jurisdictions which took part. These
supplement the individual country reports.
I’m not sure that the Tables necessarily always represent national pictures ac-
curately. Language was a great problem for many of us. And I don’t just mean
working in a foreign language. Terminological confusion abounded. For exam-
ple, Please list all the ways in which sentences may be varied in your country
(well, the French word was ‘amenager’? The suggested list to consider included:
amnistie, grâce, remise de peine, sursis probatoire, liberation conditionelle,
exécution de la peine à l’extérieur. Frequently, I wasn’t sure whether my difficul-
ties in responding were caused by the limitations of my French or the difficulties
of comparative research in this area. Did liberation anticipée or liberation
conditionelle (two different things) include pre-trial, pre-sentence release, or
simply post sentence early release? Which, if either, included a conditional dis-
charge, a suspended sentence or simply early release? Even when the language
appears similar, the details are often hugely different.
Three phrases intrigued me from the start: the French use of the expressions
Les peines encourues; Les peines prononcées; Les peines appliqués/executés. It
is difficult to translate them succinctly. The first is the possible or legal penalty,
the one that you risk if you commit the crime. The second is what the judge will
say in court. The third the punishment that you will actually suffer. We were a
group of lawyers and what we tended to concentrate on were the peines
encourues, the legally prescribed penalties. But this is deeply misleading. If we
have a project of harmonisation, do we wish to harmonise the legal maxima or
the reality? It is also I would argue not only misleading, but deeply dangerous to
concentrate on prescribed penalties.
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Stage 2
We then met for two days in Paris in April 2002. It was obvious that many coun-
try representatives were concentrating in their responses on the law found in stat-
utes or penal codes (la loi) and ignoring the actual sentences judges and/or mag-
istrates are likely to impose in practice. We decided to develop some hypotheti-
cal case studies, which became our ‘cas pratiques’ and each country representa-
tive was encouraged to complete a story to show how such a case would proceed
in their country. The environmental case study involved a lorry which because of
worn tyres crashed over a bridge dumping its diesel into a river. The driver ex-
plained that he had warned his boss about the tyres but had been told that eco-
nomic constraints on the company meant that he should continue for the mo-
ment. The story explained that it was a French company with a previous convic-
tion in France. We were asked to explore whether the managing director and/or
the company would be prosecuted in our own country and to describe the proba-
ble outcome. This provoked fascinating responses: in the analysis, Marcel Bayle
concentrated on three areas: first, the huge variations in the definitions of envi-
ronmental crimes (particularly the mens rea requirements); secondly, several
countries do not prosecute companies (e.g. Italy) and this raised difficult ques-
tions about the differences between criminal law and administrative regulation,
and indeed between different levels of criminal or quasi-criminal liability; the
third issue was whether the previous conviction in France would be recognised.
Although some countries recognise foreign convictions, this in itself led to many
practical problems. For example, in England it is confusing that a foreign convic-
tion may not become ‘a conviction’ until the appeal process is exhausted.
The second of the ‘cas pratiques’ was the cyber crime scenario. Here we dis-
covered huge variations in anti-hacking law, including variations in the law on
criminalising attempts. When it came to sentencing, it was easier to describe the
legal maximum and minimum sentences than the likely outcome (la peine
prononcée) since prosecutions are in fact rare. If there was a problem of rarity
value for the cybercrime story 2, the matter was that much worse, I’m glad to say,
for the terrorism story, but again, the replies revealed tensions in the definitions
of the crimes involved as well as in the penalties.
Stage 3
Stage 3 of the project involved not only an analysis of the cas pratiques, a re-writ-
ing of national chapters but also a questionnaire developed by the sociologist
Wanda Capeller, which she developed into a fascinating paper on the
‘Criminalisation of Risk and Penal Harmonisation’. I don’t think that I was the
only contributor who was a little bit shocked when I realised that she was plan-
ning to publish my frank responses to her questionnaire, but it was also highly re-
vealing to see the way we had all struggled to answer questions on the institu-
tions of civil control and civil society in questionnaire form. Her paper usefully
pushes us in the direction of exploring the social and political phenomenon be-
hind the harmonisation project, the tensions which are pulling at the European
Union, as much as at individual nation states.
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Harmonisation
Harmonisation can be effected in a number of ways: it can be imposed vertically
from on high, or developed horizontally through co-operation. But what exactly
do we mean by the term? Professor Delmas Marty distinguished
• la cooperation (bilateral/multilateral)
• la cooperation renforcee
• la reconnaissance mutuelle
• l’assimilation: (vertical and horizontal assimilation)
• l’harmomonisation
• l’unification: (the development of identical rules)
There are obviously strong arguments, legal, political, philosophical, ethical and
practical for harmonisation, at every level. Perhaps the most obvious are the legal
advantages whereby harmonisation may lead to an avoidance of the double jeop-
ardy (ne bis in idem) difficulty, and to closer mutual co-operation and the recog-
nition of criminal records. There are huge equality and non-discrimination ad-
vantages which flow from some sort of harmonisation. Crime does not respect
borders. But all these arguments can be stood on their heads and become argu-
ments against harmonisation. Different national cultures result in different val-
ues. This is essentially a political question: it seems to me a worthy political am-
bition that we should seek slowly to reconcile our different political and social
attitudes to crime and punishment. But it is also a legal question: Is it a legitimate
constitutional activity? Is it a desirable or necessary ambition? Is it likely to be
effective? Is it feasible? No one should underestimate the current diversity.
Pitfalls
So I move on to discuss some possible pitfalls in the harmonisation process. Per-
haps the most important for me is the question whether harmonisation is a dis-
traction from the real issues. The real fight against most crimes, especially those
such as terrorism and cybercrime, will be carried out by the police and other in-
telligence officers. Harmonising sentencing law is not an obvious political prior-
ity. But if our political masters are determined there is a really basic first ques-
tion.
Can we European countries agree on a sentencing framework, based on core
principles acceptable to all member states? What are the key principles, accept-
able to all countries? Desert, proportionality, deterrence or rehabilitation, for ex-
ample. A fundamental review of philosophical first principles is required. I re-
main very nervous that in the current political climate if we were to agree, at an
EU level, on common principles of punishment, these would lead to increased
sentences of imprisonment without any real debate as to the efficacy and justice
of such sentences.
These possible pitfalls lead me to quote the wise and cautious words of our
Chairman of today’s plenary session, Professor Kimmo Nuotio, of the Univer-
sity of Helsinki, who argued that
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‘The other direction, not the top-down model of implementing hard law, but
the softer grass-root strategy of promoting “free movement of legal ideas and
innovations” between the legal systems, and encouraging the inclusion of
comparative aspects in law drafting processes, and the use of model legisla-
tion and other soft law, might prove more successful in the long run’5.
There is a real danger that the pressure from the EU towards framework deci-
sions encouraging minimum sentences for perceived threats such as terrorism
will lead to a very superficial form of harmonisation. It will ignore the value of
diversity and the need for flexibility.
Hurdles
Even if you decide that harmonisation is a project to be espoused, there are a
number of hurdles to be jumped before anything approximating harmonisation
can be achieved. Do we need a common institutional structure? Common defini-
tions in substantive, procedural and evidential law? To agree whether we are har-
monising maximum penalties simply, or the reality? In which case, we should
start with early release rules. There is little point having clear guidelines on sen-
tencing frameworks if there is no such clarity on the interpretation and applica-
tion of those sentences. Also effective sentences demand substantial resourcing
as well as effective measures of effectiveness, which we do not have.
Conclusions: What about a principled approach?
The value of comparative law and of comparative criminology is of course to al-
low us to discover the richness, weaknesses and contradictions in our various
systems. There is a real value in diversity: I had the opportunity to go to China a
couple of times to discuss sentencing issues. The first time was to discuss the im-
portance of consistency. To argue for consistency in China seemed as curious as
arguing for worldwide consistency. But consistency is important, because incon-
sistency can be unfair. Differences must be justifiable. Diversity also has its at-
tractions: it can be a sign of richness, of what Professor Eser calls ‘this treasure of
alternatives’6. So how can we agree on common standards and policies which al-
low for imagination and innovation, and not heavier sentencing?
I offer two examples, two starting points, to contribute to the discussion. The
first is clause 135 of a Bill currently before the UK Parliament:
Clause 135 of English Criminal Justice Bill 2002:
Purposes of sentencing
Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard
to the following purposes of sentencing —
(a) the punishment of offenders;
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence);
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5 Op cit note 4, at page 470
6 Op cit footnote 4, at page 416
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders;
(d) the protection of the public; and
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by
their offences.
Parliament is being asked to legislate the aims of punishment, but without any
priority being given to these different aims. Will this help? It may, or it may not,
make judges and magistrates think a little more about their function7. But it will
do little in itself I fear to build faith in the sentencing system, or in the authority
and expertise of sentencing judges.
I offer you an alternative starting point for proportionate sentences, taken
from Professor Delmas Marty’s analysis:
But I have no more time and it is not my purpose today to find our core principles
but simply to underline the need for some hard thinking. Do please contact me by
email if you would like to discuss these issues further. I end simply with more
thanks, and not only to my colleague Dr Amanda Matravers for projecting my
PowerPoint presentation for me! This conference will have achieved a great deal
in promoting the free movement of criminological ideas and innovations. We
have lots to learn from each other. But may we not be steam-rollered into hasty
and inappropriate harmonisation. Thank you for inviting me, and thank you for
listening.
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Indicateurs Échelle de gravité
Intérêt lésé Valeur à haute protection (absolue ou quasi absolue)
Valeur à protection relative
Règles de discipline de la vie en société
Dommage Dommage réalisé quantitativement fort
Dommage réalisé quantitativement faible
Menace (mise en danger)
Faute Faute intentionnelle
Faute d’imprudence (simple ou délibéré)
Faute matérielle
7 More importantly, it puts no limits on the upper limits of sentencing.
